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2. Abstract 
This thesis examines the direct cost of raising equity for firms listed on Oslo stock 
exchange in the period 2006-2011. US research indicates a cost of raising equity 
about 4-5% of the total amount issued. According to our panel data analysis the 
Norwegian cost is 5,62 %. This is significantly lower than the 14,6% earlier 
studies made on Norwegian initial public offerings in the period 1998-2008. 
 
We do not find a significant time variable that can provide proof of changes in the 
direct cost level in the period. We do however find support for variations in the 
cost level, caused by changes in the financial market in Norway. Our findings 
indicate that the average direct costs falls with 0,00861 percentage points per 100 
points the OSEBX increases. Finally we find that the relative cost level decrease 
with size of the issue. The data indicates a reduction of 0,366 percentage points 
per billion NOK raised in the issue. 
 
We also find evidence that foreign financial institutions are significantly more 
expensive managers than the Norwegian ones, in the period 2006-2011. 
Norwegian specialists cannot charge a higher fee than their competitors in the 
Norwegian equity market. 
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3. Introduction 
3.1 Motivation 
While listed on a stock exchange, a firm incur running costs to the exchange, 
increased demand for documentation, reporting etc. From time to time the firm 
may need to increase the level of equity through a seasoned equity offering (SEO). 
This process has similarities to an initial public offering (IPO), which is the 
process of taking a firm public and listed for the first time, but the aspect of costs 
related to a SEO is far less documented. We are not aware of any research on this 
topic in Norway to date. The reason for reduced focus on the costs for SEOs 
compared to IPOs may be because the costs seem to fall between two chairs, the 
firm and the stockholders’. Who carries the actual cost of raising equity through a 
SEO? In the end the firm pays the fees associated with the issue, and new shares 
issued with a discount is at the expense of both the firm and the current 
stockholders. The higher the costs, the lower the rate of the return will be. Hence, 
we argue that the respective investors incur these costs.  
 
When raising capital for an investment through stock issues, it is essential that the 
costs of the stock issues are restricted and at an acceptable level, since 
investments may be discarded if the return does not satisfy the level of the 
expected return (Miller & Modigliani, 1958). High costs obviously reduce the 
revenue of the firm, and therefore limit the firm’s ability to act in the best interest 
of the investors, namely to maximize the firm’s value and thereby the 
shareholders return. 
 
This thesis analyses the direct costs of the SEOs that have taken place at Oslo 
Børs between 2006 and 2011. This implicate that the IPO of the mentioned firms 
has already taken place. The places where IPOs are mentioned, in theory as well 
as in the discussion, it is because we find concepts and arguments transferable to 
SEOs. 
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3.2 The research problem 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1958) there is no difference in investor’s 
preferences of funding between debt and equity. We have therefore chosen to 
focus on equity raised through stock issues, as this is an alternative available for 
all investors to participate in. The minimum investment amount for a Norwegian 
corporate bond is normally one million Norwegian kroner, and therefore 
unavailable to many investors. The investment amount when raising capital 
through equity is normally proportional to the stake already held. It is therefore 
more likely that the investor is able and willing to participate in the issue. A study 
of the cost of raising equity should therefore be of interest to a larger audience 
than a study of increasing funding through debt. 
 
As the costs of an IPO is proved to be substantial, it should be of interest for both 
firms and investors to know the level of the costs in an SEO as the costs is at the 
expense of both the firm and in the end the investors. Also, the fact that the SEO 
market is substantially larger than the market for IPOs (Bortletti et al., 2008), 
there can be considerable fees charged by the managers that goes under the radar 
of the investors. Due to limitations of data and scope we cannot assess all costs. 
We will focus on the direct costs charged by the managers, as the variable costs 
are too many and difficult to measure exactly within the scope of a master’s 
thesis. Our goal for this thesis and our main research question to answer is:  
 
How high are the direct costs of a stock issue for a firm listed on the Norwegian 
stock exchange?  
 
3.3  Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows; first we present a literature review where we 
lay down the theoretical context. Among other things we clarify some motivations 
firms have to carry out an SEO and we shed light upon the roles in the credit 
market. This is followed by a thorough review of the research question and our 
corresponding hypotheses. Chapter six describes our collected data, before we in 
the methodology chapter explain the concept of panel data and the two-sided 
mean compression test. Finally, our hypotheses, the development of the actual 
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costs and the shortcomings to this study are discussed, before we make some 
conclusions in chapter nine. 
  
4. Literature review 
In this section we would like to present a review of relevant literature on the topic. 
We start with an overview of fundamental economic theory in order to create the 
necessary context for the thesis. When the context has been established we present 
a literature review of equity issues and the role of managers.  
 
4.1 Equity offerings 
To lay a theoretical fundament of this thesis we believe it is relevant to shed light 
upon what an equity offering is and, more technically, what motivations a firm 
could have to demand supplementary equity. 
Most firms raise equity from a small number of investors. If the investors want to 
sell their stakes, they generally find the market illiquid. Later on, as the company 
matures and needs supplementary equity capital, it may become desirable to go 
public by selling shares to a larger number of investors, i.e. an IPO (Ibbotson and 
Ritter, 1995). In order to complete such an event, the company need to hire 
auditing firms, law firms and investment banks to underwrite the offer. Hence, the 
IPO produce a set of costs. In return, the company raises the funds and improves 
the liquidity of the stock. 
 
After the IPO, all subsequent issuance of shares by the company are referred to as 
SEOs. The SEOs can either be used to raise fresh equity or to reduce the positions 
of the existing shareholders (Geddes, 2005). If the SEO is used to raise fresh 
capital, the proceeds will benefit the issuing company. In the other case, where the 
stockholders want to reduce their positions, the proceeds of the sale benefit the 
shareholders. 
 
SEOs and IPOs follow comparable processes. There are however significant 
differences between them. One is the degree of information asymmetry, which is 
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relatively higher in IPOs than in SEOs. Since IPOs involve the sale in closely held 
firms, in which some of the existing shareholders may possess non-public 
information (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). On the other hand, when a firm is 
publicly listed it is much easier to get hold of their information. As Dai Kai (2012) 
points out; SEO issuers have the market closing price prior to the offer. According 
to the market efficiency theory the price of a firm in a perfect market reflects all 
available information about the firm. 
 
One definition of a SEO is (Ross et al., 2006. p. 454) “[...] a seasoned equity 
offering is a registered offering of a large block of a security that has been 
previously issued to the public.” SEOs have a substantially larger market than 
IPOs. In 2004-2005 the global SEO dollar volume was nearly double the IPO 
volume, and 2006’s near record IPO volume of $256,4 billion was still around 
80% of global SEO issuance, which was $317,2 billion (Bortletti et al., 2008). 
 
4.1.1 Motivations to carry out an SEO 
Kai Dai (2012) has listed five reasons why a firm would have the motivation to 
conduct an SEO: 
 The pecking-order theory, where the reason is that all other measures 
cannot meet cash flows required by the investment opportunities. 
 Tax and leverage cost trade-off model, where the reason is the change in 
either equity or debt, or even the debt target ratio itself. In order to keep 
the target debt ratio, the company has to make equity offerings. 
 Market timing, where managers try to sell highly priced shares when stock 
market conditions permit. 
 Corporate lifecycle stage, where young companies with high market-to-
book ratios and low operating cash flows tend to sell equity to fund 
investment, while mature companies prefer to fund investment internally. 
 Near-term cash need, where issuers have to conduct SEOs in order to 
avoid running out of cash in the near term. 
 
In general, the first two is the most common. Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking 
order theory suggests that companies tend to rely on internal financing, and prefer 
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relatively safe debt to more risky equity if the company is in need of external 
financing. In other words, a company, according to the pecking order theory, if in 
need of funding will try to retain earnings first. If this is not possible, they will try 
to issue debt and then equity as sort of last resort. Hence, the pecking order theory 
suggests that the reason for a SEO is that all other methods for raising capital 
cannot meet the company’s need for funds. 
 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) trade-off theory is more of a common practice 
where the debt-equity decision is understood as a trade-off between interest tax 
shields and costs of financial distress. As a contradiction to the pecking order, the 
trade-off theory suggests that the firm should balance its debt as to maximize the 
value of the interest tax shield and the costs of bankruptcy. The trade-off theory 
suggests that the reason for a firm to conduct an SEO is to change the relation of 
equity to debt in order to keep the targeted ratio. 
 
4.1.2 The process of an SEO 
When the management decide to issue a SEO, this needs to be approved by the 
board. After an approval the firm must choose one or more lead manager(s). 
Investopedia defines a manager as: “[...] a company or other entity that 
administers the public issuance and distribution of securities from a corporation or 
other issuing body. A manager works closely with the issuing body to determine 
the offering price of the securities, buys them from the issuer and sells them to 
investors via the manager’s distribution network”. Thereafter the lead manager 
gives advice on issuing items, for example price, timing and size. Then it is up to 
the lead manager to form a managing syndicate. With the help of the syndicate, 
the firm compose a prospectus on the offering. 
 
Before the issue: In the US, the first step, after the initial announcement, is called 
a road show (Geddes, 2005). Here the managers travel to major cities to meet with 
potential investors to discuss the planned offering. Thereafter the managers start 
the work with book building, and use this price to set an offer price (Eckbo et al., 
2007). To secure a sale of all the shares, the manager often makes contracts of 
selling above 100%. This can be done because the contracts are not binding and 
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can therefore be withdrawn. In the cases where there are more buyers than shares, 
the managers can determine who is allowed to buy and how much. 
 
After the issue there are still responsibilities for the managers. They are 
committed to provide analysis for the stocks for a given time period (Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005). They are also obligated to market making and offer price support. 
The market making commitment requires lead managers to be active market 
makers in a certain period after the offering (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Price 
support commits the leading managers to place limit orders to buy shares 
immediately after an offering without being subject to price manipulation 
restrictions (Eckbo et al., 2007). 
 
4.2 The credit market 
Our ambition is to place the managers into a marketing context. Therefore we 
describe the economy without any external factors, before making room for the 
banking/managing sector in the second part. We would also like to point out the 
roles of the market actors, such as the households, banks, investors and firms. 
Most thoroughly we try to clarify the managers role in the economy, since they 
play an important role further on in our thesis. Lastly, we attempt to enlighten the 
methods the managers use to price their services. 
 
4.2.1 Model economy 
Hellwig (1998) claims that there is no room for financial intermediation in the 
theories presented in the context of “perfect markets”. In these theories most risk 
is diversified away, and leaves no room for financial intermediaries, such as 
banks, insurance companies and finance institutions, to operate in. Hellwig (1980) 
states that in the situations with no risk and where traders do not affect the price of 
the equity, relies on the assumption that the number of trades is very large. In turn 
this leads to flat demand curves, which again means that traders have no effect on 
the price. The assumption of flat demand curves implies that any trader, with 
limited or full knowledge of the company, can buy as much shares as he likes 
without affecting price at all. In our abstract illustration below, the capital market 
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is regulated by supply and demand. The households are typically the suppliers of 
capital, as they do not spend all their income on consumption, but save part of 
their income to maintain the level of consumption in the future. Firms are 
demanders of capital. In a frictionless market, also called model economy or 
stylized economy, described further below, these mechanisms work directly 
without any intervention from a middleman or financial institution. 
 
Figure 1: Model economy 
 
We briefly mentioned the work by Miller and Modigliani above and will now 
look more into their theoretical contribution. 
 
Miller & Modigliani (1958) made three propositions, and proved that investors are 
indifferent to how the firm is funded, as their returns are not affected. Their 
proposition that the weighted average cost of capital is constant irrespective of 
capital structure. For this to be valid they made several assumptions that need to 
be fulfilled, essentially they assume what we call a frictionless market: 
 Investors are rational and perfectly informed and have identical 
expectations. 
 Investors are free to buy/sell securities and borrow capital. 
 There are no transaction costs or taxes. 
 Securities are infinitely divisible. 
 The dividend pay out ratio is 100%. I.e. all profits are paid to the investors 
in the form of dividend and there are no retained earnings. 
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 Business risk is equal among all firms within similar operating 
environment, meaning that all firms can be divided into “equivalent risk 
class”.  
 
Proposition I says: ”[...] the market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate Pk appropriate 
to its class.” (Miller & Modigliani, 1958 p. 268) This can be shown with the 
following formula: Vi ≡ (Sj + Dj) = 
   
  
. The interpretation of the formula is that the 
value of the firm is equal to the market value of the firm’s common stock plus the 
debt, or equivalently, the expected return on the firm’s asset divided with the 
expected return on a stock in class k.  This can also be stated as the average cost 
of capital, 
   
       
 
   
  
    . “That is, the average cost of capital to any firm is 
completely independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalization 
rate of a pure equity stream of its class.” (Miller & Modigliani, 1958 pp. 268-269)  
 
To prove that these two equations must hold and therefore prove the proposition, 
they showed that in the presence of a mismatch in the pricing of the stock and 
debt, the investor could buy and sell stocks and bonds to exchange the one income 
stream to another. By buying the underpriced instrument and selling the 
overpriced instrument, they can earn money without risk, also called arbitrage. 
Arbitrage will occur until the prices are equal, and the equations hold. (For further 
proof, see Miller & Modigliani 1958 pp. 268-271) 
 
Proposition II: “[…] the expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the 
appropriate capitalization rate pk for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a 
premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread 
between k and r.” (Miller & Modigliani, 1958 p. 271) This is equal to the formula  
 
             
  
  
  
 
This shows that the price per dollar of a levered stream falls as leverage increases 
(Miller & Modigliani, 1958). The cost of capital is therefore a linear function of 
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the debt-equity ratio. From proposition I and II it can therefore be concluded: That 
investors are indifferent as to how a firm funds its operations, as the value of the 
firm and the investors return are the same. Optimizing managers will therefore use 
the cheapest option available when funding new investments.  
 
Proposition III states that: “[…] the cut-off point for investment in the firm will in 
all cases be pk and will be completely unaffected by the type of security used to 
finance the investment.” (Miller & Modigliani, 1958 p. 288) In other words, the 
investment should only be undertaken if the rate of return is equal or higher than 
the expected return of any other stock in class k. 
 
4.2.2 Non-frictionless market 
The model economy is only a theoretical model to illustrate the general effects in 
a market, and the model obviously does not hold in real life. For example, people 
do not always act rationally and the existence of asymmetric information, taxes 
and transactions costs makes the theory of Miller and Modigliani of capital 
structure in a perfect market insufficient. Their assumptions do not hold, as a 
perfect capital market does not exist.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Below, the model economy has been extended to include the banking sector and 
also allow for the existence of managers. Banks and financial institutions work as 
a link between households and firms in order to reduce the friction and risk for the 
two parties. 
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Figure 2: Non-frictionless market 
4.2.2.1 Households 
According to the Factor pricing model by John H. Cochrane (2000), a household 
plans how much of its income it should save, what to consume and what portfolio 
of assets to hold in order to maximize its utility. Since high costs for an SEO 
reduces the profit of a firm, high costs reduces the utility of the household. The 
household’s basic consumption model can be expressed in the following form: 
 
First we look at the households, which are modelled by a separable utility function 
defined over current and future value of consumption: 
 
                             . 
 
The utility function captures the fundamental desire for more consumption since 
u(.), shown in graph below, is increasing and concave, suggesting that there is 
declining marginal value of additional consumption. The interpretation of the 
properties of the utility function is simply that for every unit of wealth the 
consumer receives, the household’s utility increase. However, the increase in 
utility diminishes in every new unit of wealth it collects as the consumer has 
desires for spending today and not wait for future consumption. 
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Graph 1: Utility function 
 
Further on, assuming that the household can freely buy or sell as much of the 
payoff (xt+1) as it wishes, at a price pt, denoting the original income level by e and 
denoting the total amount of the assets it chooses to buy with            , yields 
the following problem: 
 
   
           
                  
 
subject to two constraints: 
ct = et - ptξ 
The first says that the consumption level at time t is equal to original income level 
at time t minus the total amount of assets he chooses to buy at time t times the 
price at that time. 
ct+1 = et+1 + xt+1ξ 
The second constraint says that the consumption at time t+1 has to equal the 
original consumption level at time t+1 plus the total pay-off of the sold assets. 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 14 
Substituting the constraints into the objective, and setting the derivative with 
respect to ξ equal to zero yields the first order condition for an optimal 
consumption and portfolio choice: 
 
       
        
      
     . 
 
We can express the stochastic discount factor: 
   
        
      
. 
Because      is the value of consumption in the next period, and from the formula 
we get the today asset price, we need to discount this value with some variable, 
mt+1. The reason why it is stochastic is that both consumption and asset pay-offs 
are stochastic variables. (John H. Cochrane, 2000) 
 
Hence, the basic pricing formula can simply be expressed as: 
               . 
Where pt = asset price, xt+1 = asset pay-off, mt+1 = stochastic discount factor. 
 
This is the central asset-pricing formula. Given the pay-off xt+1 and given the 
household’s consumption choice ct, ct+1, it tells you what market price pt to 
expect. This is therefore the price the household expect for an SEO.  
 
4.2.2.2 Banks 
Schumpeter (1939) assigned banks with a monitoring role in the economy. 
Asymmetric information and default risks makes it necessary for the households 
to acquire information about firms before they lend them money or buy stocks, to 
minimize their exposure to risk. Monitoring the performance and credibility of the 
various firms in the market is too time consuming and demanding for the 
households. The banks have the means to gather all necessary information, 
process it, and supply the households with the information they desire. The banks 
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have more available access to information about the firms, and they therefore have 
lower monitoring costs than the households. 
 
Besides serving as a monitor of the actors in the economy, the banks operate as 
market makers, reducing the number of transactions in the market and therefore 
transactions costs (Martin Hellwig, 1998). Banks are financial intermediaries that 
obtain funds from lenders, typically the households, and lend them to firms, 
households or other institutions with demand for money (Diamond, 1984). The 
banks reduce the frictions in the market, by reducing risk for both borrower and 
lender, reducing transaction costs and the number of transactions in the market. 
Some banks also participate in the stock market by brokering stocks and bonds, or 
by assisting firms raising capital through bond or stock issues. 
 
4.2.2.3 Investors 
We can roughly divide investors into two subcategories, Informal - and 
Institutional investors. The informal investor is a person, and is characterized by 
Reitan and Sörheim (2000 p. 140) as a “[...] middle-aged man with high 
education, extensive work experience and substantial finances. Most informal 
investors are successful entrepreneurs. In terms of their investments, informal 
investors make one investment per year, usually in geographical proximity to their 
work/home.” The institutional investor is typically investment funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds and other forms of institutional savings. (Gonnard, Kim 
and Ynesta, 2008) As table 1 suggests, in Norway 2007, institutional investors 
raised 61,9% of GDP of financial assets. 
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Table 1: Institutional investors share of GDP. Source: Gonnard, Kim & Ynesta, 2008 pp. 4 
Further on, Gonnard, Kim and Ynesta (2008) points out that the insurance 
companies, that used to be the most significant institutional investor, in 2008 have 
been exceeded by investment funds, which represented 35,7% of total assets in 
2005. 
 
The investment possibilities for the investor are typically to deposit money into a 
bank account and reap a risk free rate in return, he can lend money to persons or 
companies for a rate above the risk free rate or he can invest in stocks in private or 
publicly owned firms. 
 
4.2.2.4 Firms 
Privately owned firms that perform well over time may need to increase the 
capital level of the firm in order to be able to continue its growth and increase the 
return of its owners. One way of raising new capital to the firm is to list the firm 
on the stock exchange. When the firm is listed on the exchange, the stocks 
become available to the public for investment. The return must be higher than the 
risk free rate, such as the return on a savings account due to higher risk for the 
firm to default than for a bank. Cochrane (2000) showed this by formulating two 
distinct pricing formulas, one risk free and one with risk. He derived different ps 
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for the pricing formula we presented earlier                . For the risk free 
rate the present value formula is     
 
  
    . And since the gross interest rate 
normally is larger than one, the payoff      sells at a discount. The present value 
formula for the risky good is   
   
 
  
       
  . Since the pay off of the 
investment     
  now is unknown, the discount factor 
 
  
 has to be larger than 
 
  
 in 
order for the two goods to be equally attractive to invest in. (Cochrane, 2000) 
 
4.2.2.4.1  Methods of financing 
In the introduction we mentioned different ways a firm can finance its operations. 
We will here elaborate a bit on the different possibilities. 
 
There are essentially four ways of funding an investment for a firm in a model 
economy. However, due to the fact that the market is not without frictions, a fifth 
alternative arises. First and foremost the firm can retain profits, instead of paying 
out dividend to the investors. An optimizing investor would prefer the profit to be 
retained as long as the firm can earn a higher return on the capital than the 
investor could do if he reinvested paid dividend in the market. 
 
The second option, available to most firms and new in the non-frictionless market, 
is to borrow capital from a bank. This option does not exist in the model economy 
because in this economy there are no banks. The accessibility and cost of 
borrowing from a bank depends on the firm’s financial position, and the overall 
market conditions. After the financial crisis of 2007-2009 there has been a severe 
tightening of funds available from the banking sector, as the liquidity in the 
banking sector has decreased, and the rules for the banks own level of equity 
requirements has become more severe. During the financial crisis and in the 
period immediately following, the cost of borrowing from banks was very high, 
due to high government interest rates and interbank rates. Therefore this option 
has been decreasingly attractive the last couple of years. (Deloitte, 2012) 
 
Thirdly, the firm can issue bonds in the market, giving any buyer a fixed return, 
typically over a period of three months to 30 years. Issuing bonds is not common 
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for smaller firms, as the risk level of lending to a smaller firm may be substantial. 
The interest on the bond may simply be too high for the firm to manage. Also, the 
normal minimum investment amount for the buyer of a bond is very high, often as 
high as one million Norwegian kroner. Thus, the liquidity for buying and selling 
bonds is poorer than for stocks, making it less attractive for smaller firms who 
may already have difficulties finding investors and fresh capital.  
 
The fourth alternative to the firm is to sell stocks, and the fifth and final way of 
raising capital, and the one we will cover in this thesis, is through issuing stocks. 
There are many ways of raising equity through stocks; we will here give a brief 
presentation of the most common methods.  
 
For a firm to be listed on the stock exchange it has to go through an IPO. The firm 
goes public and issues new stocks and/or sell of the stocks of the current owners. 
The ownership of the current owners is diluted and new capital is added to the 
firm.  
 
Under the umbrella SEOs, there are again a number of ways to raise equity 
through capital, for firms already listed on the stock exchange. SEOs is the 
issuance of new stocks of a listed firm to its investors as part of equity rising. 
Dividend reinvestments plans (DRIP) and dividend options are a second way of 
raising equity to the company. It can be regarded as withholding revenue, as 
investors normally are given an incentive to reinvest their dividend in return for a 
discount on new stocks. Each investor is then given the option to receive the 
dividend in cash, or use the dividend to buy new shares. The firm can choose to 
buy these shares in the market or issue new shares. This is a common way of 
raising capital in Australia and Canada (ASX 2010), as it gives the issuing firm a 
tax relief compared to paying a cash dividend. These events are, however, very 
rare in Norway, and we will therefore not include dividend reinvestments and 
dividend options in our thesis. 
 
The most common way of raising equity for a company listed on the stock 
exchange is through a private placement. A private placement is the almost the 
same as an IPO, with the stocks only being offered to private investors; normally 
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many of these are current shareholders. Often these are investor banks, pension 
funds or mutual funds. 
 
Alternatively the firm can issue rights to purchase additional shares in the firm. In 
a rights issue, stockholders are given a right to buy a given number of new shares 
per share they already own. The rights are issued to the stockholders, and the 
stockholder can choose to convert the rights into new shares when the 
subscription period for the rights ends. Some rights are tradable, and if the rights 
issue does not meet the investor’s demands, the investor can sell the rights in the 
market. The new shares are offered at a price below, or at the current market 
value, as no rational investor would buy the shares for more in a rights issue than 
they can in the market. The proceeds from the shares bought are added to the 
issuing firms equity balance. Since private placement and rights issues are the 
most common way of raising capital through equity, and the corporate action that 
the majority of investors will experience, we therefore see this as the most 
adequate method of raising capital to examine for our thesis. 
 
After World War II (WWII) Eckbo and Masulis (1995) have made a number of 
observations on the topic of SEOs in the US. They observe that internal equity has 
remained the dominant funding source after WWII, that debt dominates equity as 
an external funding source, and in periods with low internally generated equity, 
the proportion of debt financing tends to increase to finance the shortfall. Further 
on, they argue that the frequency of equity issues tends to rise during economic 
expansions. Internationally they found that retained earnings are the major source 
of finance in all the studied industrial countries, and that the external funding is 
highest in Finland, France, Japan and Italy. 
 
4.2.2.5 Stock markets 
Bernard Baruch (1955) reflected on the stock market functions as an index. He 
pointed especially out people’s confidence in certain businesses, government 
policies and general world conditions as specific drivers. Further on he stated that 
no one, not even the most experienced trader, could predict with certainty the 
development of the stock market. Baruch emphasized that the stock market 
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registers the judgement of multitudes of buyers and sellers on the many factors 
that affect businesses, what they are like today and how they will perform 
tomorrow. Bernard Baruch (1955) portrayed further on the stock market as a 
thermometer not the fever itself, and clarified that we will be in deep trouble if 
this instrument is not working properly. 
 
Investments in the stock market are made for two different reasons, the first in 
hope and confidence that the firm will make good value for money, the second in 
fear that the value of capital will be lost through inflation. 
  
What the methods of raising capital have in common is the necessity of the stock- 
and bonds market. Since the issuing firm does not have the knowledge or the 
means to reach out to a large enough mass of potential investors themselves they 
must turn to the stock market for investors. The stock market is a very efficient 
way for investors to trade positions with each other, and eases the process of 
investing. A liquid market reduces the investors’ risk of being stuck with an 
investment and not being able to liquidate positions when needed. 
 
4.2.2.6 Managers 
Some actors specialize in activities that are essential for an efficient stock market. 
Such agents normally provide a range of services that they can do more efficiently 
and cheaper than any firm or investor could do on their own, and they help to link 
buyer and seller, borrower and lender together. They might, for instance, 
specialize in selling analyzes of firms on the stock exchange, and make prediction 
of who will outperform the market in the coming period, and who will fail. These 
actors specialize in exploiting the imperfection of knowledge in the market, 
exploiting the failure of Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) assumption of perfect 
knowledge to hold in practice. The development of the financial market and 
information flows over channels, such as the internet, has made it increasingly 
difficult to possess unique information that will give a competitive advantage. 
Since all news that can drive the price of a firms stock up or down must be made 
public the minute it’s known, and this is available to everyone seconds after the 
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news has been released, the value of the analyses has fallen the last years (E24.no, 
2012). 
 
Firm analyzes is normally one division of an investment bank, where the 
corporate finance is another. The corporate finance division is specialized in 
helping firms through mergers, spin-offs, IPOs, issues etc. They have deep 
knowledge of the firms’ structure and finances, the competition, the market 
conditions, legal requirements and they also have a vast network of existing and 
potential investors they can approach when making a new issue. As stated on 
ABG Sundal Colliers home pages: “Our team of experienced M&A experts is 
responsible for structuring and executing a wide range of complex domestic and 
international transactions. These include acquisitions, divestitures, mergers, joint 
ventures, corporate restructurings, shareholder relations, recapitalisations, spin-
offs, exchange offers and leveraged buy-outs” (ABG Sundal Collier, 2013).  
 
Very few of the firms listed on the stock exchange have such deep knowledge and 
experience of doing such corporate actions; they therefore turn to the investment 
banks in order to maximize the return on their actions. Investment banks that 
assist in issues are called managers, and their job is to price the shares and decide 
the number of shares necessary to achieve the amount of capital desired raised in 
an issue. The manager makes a prospect for each issue, describe the financial state 
of the company, the competition etc. The manager must make the issue known in 
the market in order to attract enough investors, and this takes time and money. 
There are also fixed costs associated with a stock issue, such as listing fees, 
document fees etc.  
 
4.2.2.6.1  Managing syndicates 
Syndicate formation begins with the selection of the lead manager by the issuing 
firm, according to Corwin and Schultz (2005). There has been competition for the 
largest IPOs and SEOs, especially in the US, as most managers seek top rankings 
and better reputation to be able to charge a higher managing fee. If numerous 
managers contribute in the competition to be lead manager, the issuer is very 
likely to pick a co-manager. Corwin and Schultz (2005) claims that co-managers 
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is most likely to be chosen because of their ability to provide analyst coverage or 
simply because their distribution system complements the lead manager well. One 
can draw parallels from Corwin and Schultz’ (2005) study, to the survey made by 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) on CFOs reasoning for electing a manager for an IPO. 
They found that 90,6% of the CFOs asked agreed or strongly agreed to the 
importance of the overall reputation when appointing a manager. Further, 87,5% 
of the CFOs found the managers expertise and connections important, and 82,5% 
answered that they also agreed to the importance of the manager’s reputation for 
analyses and research department.  
Book-managers may also, on occasion, advise the issuer on a good 
complementing co-manager, for example they may cover different countries etc. 
The leading manager is also very likely to limit the number of co-managers, if the 
issuer has a larger or more extensive syndicate in mind. Further on, both the issuer 
and the lead manager choose non-managing syndicate members. These are called 
the underwriters, or simply managers.  
 
In some cases, when the stock is seldom traded, managers are faced with the 
difficult task of pricing a stock with no former trading record. This is often done 
by using comparable, already traded companies and trying to define the markets 
interest in the stock. The valuations with the comparison across comparable stocks 
are likely to be quite the same, irrespective of manager and size of the syndicate. 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) elaborate that since different managers have different 
investor clienteles, then the managers’ ability to express the markets willingness 
to pay might be more accurate with a larger syndicate and supplementary 
managers. Hence, issuers or lead managers tend to select managers with different 
client bases. For example, the 1996 IPO of Danish pharmaceutical firm 
Neurosearch, employed UBS as global coordinator and book manager. Carnegie 
AB, a Nordic region specialist, acted as Scandinavian lead manager and co-lead 
manager for the rest of the world, a position shared with the Danish bank, 
Unibank. This structure ensured coverage of all main Nordic investors, including 
Danish retail via the two junior syndicate members. UBS, on their hand, 
concentrated on the larger European and international investors. 
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Another example is First Energy Capital, a Canadian investments dealer 
specializing within the energy industry (First Energy Capital, 2013), who was co-
manager in the issue of Wentworth Resources Ltd., a firm operating within the oil 
and gas industry. First Energy Capital was most likely appointed co-manager due 
to their industry expertise, ability to estimate the value of the firm, their potential 
and threat etc. and their access to investors with high interest for the industry. 
 
Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that reputable managers are 
associated with less uncertainty and thus a higher stock price. Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003) findings confirms that the price is higher with a more reputable 
bank as leading manager. As a consequence, a manager’s reputation and ability to 
certify an SEO is harmed if the manager participates in the syndicate of mispriced 
or underachieving SEOs. Hence, all managers in a syndicate have incentives to 
work towards the appropriate pricing of the SEO (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). 
Corwin and Schultz studied IPOs, but in this specific case their findings are 
directly applicable in SEOs.  
Bowen et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of capital, 
and more specific the effects from a manager with a reputation for superior ability 
or with lower forecast dispersion on the cost of capital. They based their analysis 
on 4.766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, and their results suggested that more 
analyst coverage is associated with a higher cost of capital. They also found that a 
firm with a lead manager with reputation for superior ability has incrementally 
lower SEO underpricing. By looking at the trading volume and the market share 
of the brokers, Jarnecic and Liu (2013) found that broker affiliation had a 
significant impact on the trading volume. They also found evidence suggesting 
that broker reputation was one of the primary characteristics that influenced 
broker performance. Hume and Sharma (2009) studied the importance of the 
manager and whether the manager influenced the equity market. They found 
evidence of lower returns for the firms that appointed the more prestigious 
manager, suggesting that the more reputable the manager is, the more they can 
charge the issuing firm in a SEO. In contrast, McLughlin et al. (2000) studied the 
long-term effect from an investment banker reputation and three-year post issue 
returns. Using a sample of SEOs conducted between 1980 and 1994 they found no 
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significant relation between reputation and stock prices in the long-run, suggesting 
that the reputational effects only apply in the short run and evens out as the time 
goes by. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) examined the effect on expected flotation costs of 
including co-managers in the managing syndicate. Their result showed that the 
characteristics of co-managers taking part have significant effect on flotation costs 
while, however, the effect of the number of co-managers is largely insignificant. 
They, to some extent, explain this by the fact that highly reputable managers - as a 
part of the syndicate - serve a certification role, reducing information asymmetries 
and yielding lower flotation costs. Further on, it is shown from Huang and Zhang 
(2011) that the number of managers for a seasoned equity offer is negatively 
correlated with the offer price.  From the same sample they observe that larger 
manager syndicates also lower offer price discounts. From a sample of 1.638 IPOs 
from 1997 through 2002, Corwin and Schultz (2005) have examined the 
respective managing syndicates. They found strong evidence of information 
production, meaning that the offer prices are more likely to be adjusted internally 
when the syndicate has more co-managers. The writers suggest that the tight 
relationship between managers might help to mitigate problems such as moral 
hazard and free riding.  
 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) also suggest that the issuers benefit from an increasing 
number of managers in the syndicate, but that several factors also speak in favour 
of limiting the syndicate size. First they mention that the prestigious book 
managers and co-managers demand significant fees, so that the syndicate size is 
limited by the issuer’s budget. Also they point out that co-managers compete with 
book-managers for future managing business providing the book-managers with 
supplementary incentive to constraint the syndicate. Finally, Corwin and Schultz 
(2005) points out that the manager spread tend to increase with the number of co-
managers, at least for relatively small issues. 
 
As one would expect, the number of syndicate members varies directly with the 
size of the offering. However there are some factors that influence syndicate size. 
Under an IPO, syndicates are normally larger than syndicates for SEO’s. This is 
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typically to ensure a broader distribution of the IPO. In an SEO however, the 
distribution is already made so that the syndicate can focus entirely on existing 
clients and markets. From the book runner’s perspective, a small syndicate is 
easier to control and the information flow is more efficient. 
 
An example of a large managing syndicate is the IPO of Prudential Financial Inc. 
in late 2001 that raised approximately $3.5 billion through a syndicate of 47 banks 
and brokers. Appendix 1 describes the syndicate. 
 
4.2.2.6.2  Book building 
Securities and Exchange Board of India guidelines (1995 p. 676) defines book 
building as: “A process undertaken by which a demand for the securities proposed 
to be issued by a body corporate is elicited and built up and the price for such 
securities is assessed for the determination of the quantum of such securities to be 
issued by means of a notice, circular, advertisement, document or information 
memoranda or offer document.” 
 
Singh (2008) elaborates further that book building is a process practiced in most 
developed countries for marketing a public offer of equity shares. Because neither 
the issuer nor the lead manager has an exact price or knowledge of the demand for 
the new public issues, book building is used as a tool for discovering the fair price 
and help the least informed investors, as well as the issuer and manager, to find 
the true demand for the new stocks. 
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Figure 3: Book building      Source: Singh (2008) p. 8 
 
In the book building the price is determined on the basis of demand received or at 
a price above or equal to the floor price. Books are built by a Book Runner Lead 
Manager (BRLM) to know the everyday demand. 
 
Through Figure 3 Singh (2008) explain further how books are built in India, a 
process comparable to the Norwegian market: 
 The issuer appoints an investment bank as BRLM. 
 The issuing firm consults with the BRLM in drawing a prospectus, 
which does not mention the price of the issues, but includes other 
details about the company. 
 A definite period is fixed as the bid period, which implies the BRLM 
conducts awareness campaigns. 
 The BRLM appoints syndicate members, managers, to underwrite the 
issue, or a “net offer to the public”. 
 The syndicate members create demand and ask each investor for a 
number of shares and the share price. 
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 The BRLM builds an order book based in information received from 
managers and with the issuing company they determine the issuing 
price, known as the “market-clearing price”. 
 The book is closed, prospectus is filed and application money is 
received. 
 
Singh (2008) have also listed some limitations to the book building-phenomenon: 
 Appropriate for mega issues only. In the case of the potential investors, 
the companies can adjust the attributes of the offer according to the 
preferences to the potential investors. 
 The issuing company should be fundamentally strong and well known 
to the investors. 
 The investors are aware of the various parameters affecting the market 
price of the securities. But, such conditions are very seldom found in 
practice. 
 There are possibilities of price rigging on listing as promoters may try 
to bail out syndicate members. 
 
4.2.2.6.3  The managing spread 
As California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) points out in 
their article “Understanding the managing spread” (1993), one of the issuers’ 
primary goals in any public offering is to get their hands on the funds issued at the 
lowest possible cost. A significant component of this total cost is the managing 
spread. This spread will of course vary, depending on the characteristics of the 
issuer, the project and the financing. 
 
CDIAC (1993) defines the managing spread as “[...] the difference between the 
price at which a manager purchases bonds from an issuer and the price at which 
the bonds are resold to investors.” This is also true for stocks. (CDIAC, 1993. p. 
1) 
 
One may divide the spread into four components: a management fee, expenses, 
managing fee and takedown. CDIAC (1993) clarifies further that the management 
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fee compensates the manager for the investment banking services provided to the 
issuer. This fee may include a development of a financing plan and a maturity 
schedule suited to the needs of the issuer, origination and marketing tasks, 
assessment of market conditions, advice on the timing of the sale and preparation 
of reports on the post-sale results of the transaction. The expense fee reimburses 
the manager for out-of-pocket costs. This includes usually the counsel fee, and 
perhaps some travel costs, especially if the manager is located far away from the 
issuer. The managing fee is due to the fact that the manager cannot always be 
certain that investors will readily purchase all of the issuers stocks. This fee is to 
cover the possibility that some of the stocks may have to be reoffered at a lower 
price or taken into the manager’s inventory. According to CDIAC (1993) the size 
of the fee is directly connected to the market risk involved as in a strong and less 
volatile market all the stocks could very likely be pre-sold. Hence, the manager’s 
risk would be close to nothing and the manager fee can be dropped. Essentially, 
the takedown is a sales commission paid to the manager. In order to obtain the 
most favourable stock price, the issuer has to provide the manager’s sales force a 
sufficient incentive – to work hard at finding investors willing to accept the 
highest purchasing price. 
 
4.3  Pricing and competition 
The market for managers in Norway might best be described as an oligopoly. 
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) an oligopoly has the following 
characteristics: 
- Few but large close rivals. 
- Interdependence: Firms cannot act independent of each other. Meaning 
that a firm must take the rivals potential reaction into account when 
making own decisions.  
- Barriers to entry: Because it is very costly to enter such a market, the 
oligopolists often remain in their positions. 
We assume that the managers compete in a Cournot competition, which is a 
competition within a duopoly; the firms compete in quantity, different from the 
Bertrand competition, where the companies typically compete in prices. 
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Bertrand (1883) shed light over the competition within an oligopoly, in a response 
to the Cournot model we will quickly account for Bertrands way of thinking, 
before explaining the Cournot model further.  
 
In a Bertrand (1883) competition with rational consumers, where two competitors 
offer homogeneous goods, they will obtain half the market each if they offer the 
same prices as, the consumers are indifferent to which supplier they buy from. 
However, if one supplier lowers his price marginally below the competitor’s price, 
he will win the whole market as the consumers maximize their utility by buying at 
the lowest possible price. Knowing that the competitor is likely to lower its prices 
to steal the market, the firm lowers their prices as well not to lose their share of 
their market. According to Bertrand (1883) the firms continue to undercut their 
opponents’ prices as long as the marginal revenue is larger or equal to marginal 
cost. At the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost the firms share the 
market and neither firm makes any profit. By reducing the price below marginal 
cost, the firm can again supply the whole market alone, but will then lose money 
on each good sold. Raising the price to increase the revenue per good is not an 
option, as no consumer will buy those goods if they can get them cheaper from the 
competitor. This dilemma is a major caveat with a Bertrand competition with 
homogeneous goods, as one normally ends at the point with equal prices and 
market shares and no profit. Therefore this model of competition is not applicable 
to the competition between the managers. 
 
The model of competition in prices by Cournot (1838) preceded Bertrand’s model 
with fifty years. In order for Cournot’s model to hold he made several 
assumptions: 
- That there were (n) producers of a homogenous good, implying the 
same cost curve for all. (n) = 2 in the example below. 
- Barriers to entry, for example high set up costs. 
- Each producer maximizes profits given output of the other firm. 
- Below we have also assumed a constant marginal cost (c) for both 
firms. 
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If we assume a firms profit is given by: 
 
                 ,  
 
where:  
 
π = profit, q = quantity, p = price, c = cost 
 
 
Firm 1 believes firm 2 produce the quantity q2. 
 
 
Graph 2: Cournot competition            Source:  Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) 
 
The curve d1(q2) is called firm 1’s residual demand. It gives all possible 
combinations of firm 1’s quantity given q2. 
 
Optimal output for firm 1 is where marginal cost intercepts with marginal 
revenue: 
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Graph 3: Reaction curve              Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) 
 
Given the linear demand and constant marginal cost, the function q1’’(q2) is also 
linear. q1’’(q2) is firm 1’s reaction which means that it yields firm 1’s best choice 
in every situation given what he thinks firm 2 is doing. 
 
Equilibrium is found by drawing the two reaction functions in the same graph. 
Equilibrium is found in the intercept between the two graphs. 
 
 
Graph 4: Cournot equilibrium             Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) 
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According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) this relationship applies both to the 
demand- and the supply side of the managing service, and to the demand- and 
supply side of the issued stock. If there is a high demand for the stock, there 
should be less work for the manager in the book building process, and lower risk 
of not raising enough capital. Therefore attractive firms should pay a lower fee for 
the stock issue than firms promising lower return and higher risk. 
 
The price of a service, such as a stock issue, is closely linked with the supply and 
competition in the market. In the case of monopoly, only one provider - the 
company, is free to set the price to maximize its profit. With increasing 
competition, as above with two providers called an oligopoly, the price is lowered 
as the two suppliers compete in quantities to attract customers. By lowering the 
price below the competitor, the firm can in theory capture the entire market if the 
goods or service are perfect substitutes, and accessible to all, i.e. Bertrand 
competition. Most markets are somewhere in between monopoly and free market, 
very few have indeed monopoly power. 
 
There are typically two measures of the degree of competition in a market, the 
concentration ratio (CR), such as    or     and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).     measures how much of the market is served by the four actors with 
the largest market share. Similarly     measures the market power of the eight 
largest actors. If the     or     is 0%, there is perfect competition, as there are 
many actors with an infinite small share of the market. Values between 0-50% 
indicate low market power concentration. 50-80% medium competition, this level 
is typical for an oligopoly. 80-99% is a highly concentrated market, while 100% 
typically is a monopoly.  
 
HHI is considered a better measurement of market power, as the HHI reflects the 
combined influence of a few firms with large market power and unequal firm 
sizes. The     measurement reflects only a single point on the concentration 
curve, but the HHI provides a more complete sense of the shape of the curve 
(Pepall et al., 2008). A HHI of 0-100 indicates a highly competitive market. 
Values between 100 and 1500 indicate an unconcentrated market, 1500-2500 
indicates a moderate concentration of market power and a HHI above 2500 
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indicates a highly concentrated market (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
trade Commission, 2010).  
 
If the goods or services are imperfect substitutes the firms can charge a different 
price than the competitor, as their good may be superior to the other goods 
available. Some managers specialize in raising debt or equity for firms, while 
others may only have this as a subordinate activity in their operations. As a 
consequence we do expect, in our analysis, to find evidence of managers taking a 
larger share of the market and charging a different price than the competitors. 
 
4.3.1  Supply and demand 
When the manager has solved the optimal level of service supply to the equity 
issue market, then the demand for these services will determine the price. 
Normally supply is an increasing function of price, the higher the price the more 
willing the producers will supply the market as profits rise with increased price 
assuming constant marginal costs. Demand, on the other hand, is described with a 
downward sloping curve, i.e. demand decreases with increasing prices. The 
optimal price and quantity is found at the intersection of the two lines. (Pepall et. 
al, 2008) 
 
Graph 5: Supply and demand               Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) pp. 25  
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Armstrong et al. (2010) states that imperfect competition is generally 
characterised as every investor’s conviction that he faces a descending demand 
curve or an inclining price curve for equity in the market. Armstrong et al. (2010) 
elaborates further that this scenario occurs when the number of demanders is 
finite. Each investor identifies the effect he has on price. Hence, the price curves 
are upwards sloping in demand. The fact that price increases in demand has 
another implication, namely the fact that for investors that are better informed, the 
curve is likely to be steeper, relative to the curve for the investors that is less 
informed. Established from the fact that the trades of the well informed investors 
have a greater impact on price than the trades of the less well informed traders 
(Lambert and Verrecchia, 2010). 
 
In the case of equity issues, the relationship between supply and demand must be 
considered twice. At first it is the supply of the service of managing equity issues, 
and firms demand for such issues. Secondly, the firms demand for equity issues 
are also the supply of newly issued stocks to the market, and the price and 
liquidity of these stocks depends on the investors demand for stocks. Hence, it 
may, in periods, be a high demand from the firms of raising new capital through 
issuing equity. But the market may not be interested in the stocks, and the 
manager runs a risk of failing the goals of the issue. Also the issue itself may take 
longer time because both effects would increase the price of the issue. 
 
In times with a high demand from investors for new investment opportunities and 
the firms have a high demand of increased liquidity which can be illustrated with 
a shift outwards of the demand curve, the managers can theoretically charge a 
higher price as the firms and investors willingness to pay increase and there is a 
pressure on the managers capacity. 
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Graph 6: Increased demand               Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) pp. 26 
 
The fact that increased demand leads to increasing prices is even more evident if 
we assume that the manager’s capacity is fixed in the short run, due to long hiring 
and training periods etc. This can be illustrated with a fixed vertical line 
representing supply, and an outwards shift of the demand curve. 
 
 
Graph 7: Increased demand with fixed supply.           Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) pp. 26 
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4.3.2  Price clustering 
Several studies have suggested that the pricing of an SEO have been subject to 
price clustering, which means that the price is expected to be set as a common 
integer. Lee et al. (1996) observe a trend to set the offer price to the nearest 
integer rate.  Corwin (2003) found strong evidence that offer price tend to be 
rounded to even dollar amounts. Mola and Loughran (2004) did further studies 
within this topic and concluded that big banks are taking more market shares and 
have more pricing power than the smaller ones. Loderer, Sheehan and Kadlec 
(1991) examined 1.600 SEOs for the years 1980-1984 from the US. Oppose to the 
above findings, their study reveals very little evidence that managers 
systematically set offer price below the market price. 
 
4.3.3 Information asymmetry 
Loderer et al. (1991) point out that information asymmetry is likely to be a smaller 
problem for SEO pricing than for the pricing of an IPO.  Corwin (2003) measured 
the information problem by firm size and the bid-ask spread, and found little 
evidence of a reliable relationship between information asymmetry and the spread. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) used three pricing measures to consider if the 
information during the book-building period was taken into account in the price. 
They found that expected discounting increased when more positive private 
information was released during the book-building period. Hence, former studies 
insinuate that information asymmetry is not essential in SEO pricing. 
 
4.4 Economies of scale 
In the production of most goods and services, the supplier of these goods and 
services is applied with both fixed and variable costs. If the marginal cost of 
producing a good is below the average cost, then the average cost is falling 
(Pepall et al., 2003). For instance, if the firm has high fixed cost and low variable 
costs, then the products will on the average become cheaper to produce with 
increasing quantity. This effect is called economies of scale. Economies of scale 
are crucial to the existence of many financial institutions such as fund manager 
etc. A financial institution can benefit from the fact that it is relatively cheaper to 
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deal in larger quantities than in several smaller ones as you only pay the fixed fee 
once. Many financial institutions therefore offer to invest on the behalf of savers 
and buy large bulk transactions on behalf of many customers at the same time to a 
much smaller cost then they would have been able to achieve if they traded one by 
one. 
 
It is not only high fixed cost that gives rise to economies of scale. In his book, 
“Wealth of Nations” from 1776, Adam Smith introduced the fact that large firms 
could divide tasks into smaller assignments. This is not possible for smaller firms, 
as there are too many assignments and too few people. When workers could 
specialise in only one or two assignments, instead of the production of the whole 
good, each worker became more efficient. As a consequence of this specialisation 
the overall productivity of the large firm increases. This means that the workers 
are more profitable for the larger firm, relative to the workers of the small firm. 
 
Since larger firms have the possibilities to specialise assignments and produce 
more goods that reduces the average cost, the large firm has a competitive 
advantage over the smaller firm. It can produce more goods and it can produce 
them cheaper than the small firm, therefore the larger firm can charge a lower 
price than the competitor. 
 
 4.4.1 Types of costs 
There are two types of costs in an equity issue, direct and indirect. The direct costs 
are the fees paid to the manager, guarantor, lawyers, the stock exchange, printing 
and distribution of prospects etc. Corwin (2005) used the bid-ask spread of the 
newly issued shares and the existing shares in order to measure the level of 
asymmetric information. This spread i.e. the discount at which the new shares are 
issued are borne by the existing owners of the firm, and this discount is thus an 
indirect cost for them (Smith, 1977). Another indirect cost is that in a private 
placement some investors are offered to purchase new shares from the firm. This 
increases the number of shares issued by the firm, diluting the current position of 
the other stockholders. The shares will only be diluted if the new shares are issued 
at a too large discount, and if the firm does not perform a repair issue to mitigate 
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the dilution. Since there are more shares that will distribute the cash flows 
generated by the firm, the value of each stock decreases. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007) 
 
4.4.2 Economies of scale in equity issues 
In an equity issue there are for instance fixed fees to Oslo Børs, 
Verdipapirsentralen (VPS) and more or less fixed fees such as fees to lawyers, 
printing of documents etc. The variable fee, the main driver of cost, is the fee 
charged by the mangers for their performance. For managers, the work associated 
with raising capital is a decreasing function of size. The manager does rarely have 
to put in twice as much effort into raising 100 million NOK as he has to do with 
50 million NOK, since the prospectus is roughly the same, the lawyers do the 
same work etc. 
 
This can be illustrated graphically with a concave function of effort and size: 
 
Graph 8: Economies of scale   Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) pp.  
 
We can clearly see that the distance size      is larger than distance in 
effort     . Less effort means that wage cost to the employers of the manager is 
a decreasing function of the size of the issue. Hence, the relative cost should also 
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Smith (1977) studied manager fees and other expenses across issue size and found 
that the issue size was negatively related to the manager fee, which he explains 
with economies of scale. Lee et al. (1996) found nearly the same when they 
studied SEO issuing in the period 1990-1994. They found a direct cost average of 
7,1%. As a partly contradiction, Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) found that the 
issuers were facing what they called a “u-shaped spread”. At first, the spread 
decreases, as the fixed costs are baked into the proceeds. When more capital is 
issued, above a given amount, the spread will increase again due to what Kai Dai 
(2012) refers to as diseconomies of scale and the increase in variable cost. This 
effect is due to managerial inefficiencies (Emmons et al., 2001), increased adverse 
selection and agency problems that lead to higher placement costs, and due to 
increased difficulty of finding investors willing to participate (Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2000). (Hansen (2001) and Kim et al. (2010) also verifies this finding of 
a “u-shaped spread”. 
 
4.5 The timing of a SEO 
A number of theories have been published on the topic of the timing of an SEO. 
Several of these theories takes into account the phase of the business cycle that 
exists or is expected according to Eckbo and Masulis (1995). One can argue that 
CFOs and board of directors that are able to plan ahead and raise capital in 
advance of any liquidity squeeze have a stronger position to discuss price and 
timing with the mangers than firms with a immediately need for capital, i.e. firms 
with a near term cash need as Kai Dai (2012) called it. According to Chloe, 
Masulis and Nanda (1993) an adverse selection argument is pointed out where 
firms choose between issuing debt and equity across business cycle expansions 
and contractions. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) claims that managers tends to issue stock when it is 
overvalued and avoid issuing when its undervalued, yet profitable business 
projects exists that otherwise would have been lost if equity issue is delayed or 
forgone. Furthermore, Cloe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) observe that since 
expansion periods imply more beneficial investment opportunities, firms are less 
likely to forgo investments as a consequence of the stock being underprized. 
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Empirical backing for this is found in Moore (1980) who argues that the 
frequency of equity offers relative to debt offers rises in periods of economic 
upturn. 
 
Under Myers’ (1984) “pecking order” hypothesis, firms are believed to prefer 
internal finance projects if available, before issuing low risk debt and then finally 
issue equity as sort of a last resort. If we assume that a business cycle downturn 
reduces internal resources of funds, then the equity offerings will become 
relatively more attractive. 
 
In the model by Stultz (1990), debt issuance becomes more appealing when free 
cash flow increases. In an economic contraction, if the earnings fall less than 
capital spending, which is typical in such situation, Stultz (1990) argue that free 
cash flow might increase and by that also increase the desirability of debt offers. 
He also argues that the cost of the debt offers is an underinvestment in profitable 
project, which seem to be less of a problem in economic downturns. 
 
Eckbo and Masulis (1995) observe from reviewing all these theories that the 
timing of the equity issues predict that the occurrence of equity and debt offers 
vary with the business cycle. They pointed out that the frequency of equity issues 
tends to increase during economic expansion. They also found that the degree of 
the negative market reaction to firm commitment offers of equity decreases in 
expansions. 
 
5. Research question and hypotheses 
In this subsection we would like to present our hypotheses, which we find 
interesting to test based on the theory, presented above and our research question:  
 
How high are the direct costs of a stock issue for a firm listed on the  
Norwegian stock exchange?  
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5.1  Development of costs 
Miller and Modigliani made several assumptions in order for their theory on 
constant weighted average capital cost to be valid. It is obvious the case that these 
do not hold in real life. First of all, there are normally transaction costs for 
majority of financial transactions as institutions demand compensation for any 
work and risk associated with the transaction. Secondly, taxes do exist and since 
debt is tax deductible. This lowers the cost of debt making it more attractive 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). More crucial is the assumption of perfect 
information.  
 
Perfect information means that all information is available to everybody 
immediately, and that the public has complete knowledge of all the firm’s 
financials, plans etc. Due to frictions, lags and capacity limitations of both 
systems and individuals there will, however, never be perfect information. Unique 
information is crucial in the financial market in order to earn abnormal returns on 
investments. Hence, if everybody had the same information and acted rationally, it 
would be impossible to outperform the market. A large part of the job for a 
manager is to produce and spread information to investors as they can do this 
more efficiently than the issuer itself due to its networks, as we have argued 
above. Thus, in more efficient markets managers can charge lower fees for issues. 
However, we might assume that with technological development, information 
spreads faster, cheaper and is more easily available to the public. Therefore more 
technological inventions will bring the market closer to perfect information over 
time. As a consequence one may assume that the direct cost for issues should 
decrease over time as the markets become more efficient. Finally Miller and 
Modigliani (1958) assumed that investors are rational and behave thereafter, 
optimizing their utility. This is a very common assumption in economics, making 
generalization easier. However, in recessions and periods with descending stock 
markets, investors may be driven by fear, reducing exposure and making irrational 
decisions. Also in increasing stock prices, investors may be blinded by the thought 
of ever rising prices and therefore overinvest in overvalued assets. Such over-
optimism may be one of the reasons for the housing bubble in the United States 
that arguably lead to the financial crisis that started the summer of 2007 (CNBC, 
2012). 
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Elaborating further on the assumption by Miller and Modigliani (1958) of perfect 
information, one can argue that the reduced creditability between financial 
institutions during a recession such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be 
thought of as reduced flow of information. With reduced information flow, the 
potential for managers to exploit the asymmetric information increases. We 
should consequently see increased fees during the financial crisis, but that the cost 
level returns to a “normal” level in the period after. This is very much in line with 
the observations by CDIAC (1993), that the size of the fee is directly connected to 
the market risk. As the risk or perceived risk during the financial crisis rose to 
extreme levels we should see that the fees charged by the managers increases 
during the financial crisis. Graph 9 below shows the increased risk in the period 
2007-2009 on Oslo Børs. 
 
 
Graph 9: 10-day volatility OSEBX 2006-2011                Source: Bloomberg 
 
Eckbo and Masulis (1995) proved that frequency of equity issues increases in 
periods of expansion. Therefore there will, in periods of expansion, be a higher 
demand for managers’ assistance in equity issues. We assume that the managers 
have limited capacity and can only take on a limited number of issues at once. 
Thus, the supply is fixed in the short run. As we argued earlier, this will lead to 
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increased prices. Antithetically, in recessions there should be lower demand for 
equity issues and correspondingly, opposite to the example above, prices will fall. 
With fewer issues being made, the competition to lead the issues increase, 
pressuring prices downwards.  
 
The effects of a recession on the fees charged by a manager are therefore 
ambiguous and dependent on the strength of each push and pull factor. As our 
period extends from 2006 and through the financial crisis of 2007-2009, we get 
one and a half year of normal market conditions, before two years of recession 
and then the final two years of recovery. In his speech at London School of 
Economics, Sir Mervyn King, governor of the bank of England, argued that the 
financial crisis is “[...] far from over[...]”, and that “[...] fundamental changes are 
needed to the international system before confidence can be regained.” (The 
Guardian, 2013) Following the same pattern Bloomberg argue in their article 
“Sorry, but Europe’s Economic Crisis Is Not Over”, that the financial crisis was 
followed by the Euro crisis of 2010-2012. (Bloomberg, 2013) In this thesis we 
will argue that the crisis ended in the second quarter of 2009, where the bottom of 
Oslo Børs was reached and the volatility fell back to 2006 levels, as graph 10 
shows. 
 
 
Graph 10: Value and volatility on Oslo Børs     Source: Oslo Børs and Bloomberg 
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Hypothesis I: There have been significant changes in the direct costs of an 
equity issue in the period 2006-2011. 
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To test this, we form a null hypothesis (    and an alternative hypothesis (    
representing the case to be proven. Where the (    says that the level of the direct 
costs (DCL) is identical in each period, and the (    claims that they are not 
equal. 
 
(   : DCL Q1 2006 = DCL Q2 2006 = ... = DCL Q4 2011 
(     DCL Q1 2006 ≠ DCL Q2 2006 ≠ ... ≠ DCL Q4 2011 
 
5.2 Economies of scale 
In section 4.3 we described economies of scale and its’ importance in the 
economy. Since economies of scale especially as a significant driver of financial 
institutions’ value creation in general, we would like to investigate if economies 
of scale are present in the process of raising equity in Norway. We will also 
measure to what extent they affect the cost level of an issue. The findings of 
Smith (1977), Lee et al. (1996) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), which we 
presented earlier, are indications and partly supportive evidence on the presence 
of economies of scale in Norwegian economy. Ledaal (2009) also found clear 
evidence of benefits of scale in Norwegian IPOs. 
 
The number of managers varies directly with the size of the offering, i.e. the larger 
the issue the more managers there are, cooperating in the issue. This is mostly due 
to the need of reaching a large enough mass of investors and the fact that one have 
to utilize complementary market knowledge and networks of the managers. The 
reasoning is that using two or more complimentary managers is a more efficient 
way of raising the capital. According to Singh (2008) the need for a time-
consuming book building-process only applies for mega issues. This is due to the 
fact that Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) assumption of a frictionless market, with 
perfect knowledge and no friction does not hold. The managers needs time to 
make the issue know in the market and reach all potential investors. Hence 
managers of smaller issues need less time and work to run their books and 
therefore they incur lower costs. 
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Due to the findings of previous studies we have mentioned, of the costs IPOs and 
SEOs, we believe that the benefits of complimentary managers and the economies 
of scale are stronger than the cost of a book running process. Hence, we believe 
that we will find evidence of economies of scale in Norwegian equity issues. We 
would also like to measure to what degree the economies of scale affect the cost 
level of an equity issue in relation to the amount raised. 
 
 
 
 
We formulate the following    and   : 
  : DCL of raising 1 mill NOK = DCL of raising 5 mill NOK = ... = DCL of 
raising 15 billion NOK 
  : DCL of raising 1 mill NOK ≠ DCL of raising 5 mill NOK ≠ ... ≠ DCL of 
raising 15 billion NOK 
 
5.3  Specialists 
In section 4.1.2.6.1 Managing Syndicates, we presented several views from 
different studies on the importance and implications of the managers reputation 
and abilities. The reputation of the manager is an important factor when the issuer 
is selecting manager for the equity issue. As there are several factors the issuer 
must take into consideration when appointing a manager or several. Some of them 
are: 
 Will the manager, or managers, be able to raise the amount of capital the 
issuer needs?  
 To what extent can the manager deliver the analyst coverage needed and 
reduce the under pricing of the new stocks issued? 
 Which signals will the manger and the issue send to the market? 
As Hume and Sharma (2009) found, a better reputation for the manager is a 
competitive advantage, meaning that the service they provide is inhomogeneous to 
the competitors and they can charge a higher price relative to the case of 
homogeneous services, as we rationalized in section 4.2. A manager with a good 
record and references reduces the risk of failing to raise capital or that the market 
Hypothesis II: There are economies of scale in equity issues in Norway, and 
they are increasing with the size of the issue. 
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will misinterpret the issuer’s intentions for the issue. And as Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003) found; more reputable managers leads to a higher price for the new 
issued stocks, reducing the indirect loss of the current shareholders. Hence, we 
can argue that a manager that specialises in asset analysis, trading and issues will 
have a larger share of the market if prices offered are identical. And they will, on 
average, charge a higher fee for issues than non-specialists, such as consultancy 
firms, other banks etc. We therefore use Norwegian financial institutions as a 
proxy for a specialist for raising equity for firms listed on Oslo Børs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Again we form a    and   : 
  : DCL manager type 1 = DCL manager type 2 = ... = DCL manager type 4 
  : DCL manager type 1 ≠ DCL manager type 2   ...   DCL manager type 4 
 
6. Data description 
We have investigated the direct costs of equity issues in Norway, and have 
gathered data on all equity issues made in the period 2006-2011 through the 
prospectuses of the issues. Oslo Børs provided the prospectuses to us, and the 
sample is complete for the period. Due to legal requirements and changes in the 
requirements for prospectuses, the availability of older prospectuses is limited, 
and we therefore decided to analyse a shorter period with a complete sample 
instead of a more longitudinal study with less accuracy. The sample consists of 
177 issues over a period of 24 quarters. Two are excluded from the sample as they 
are not issues made to raise equity for the firm, but are a result of a large number 
of newly issued shares to management, shareholders etc. as bonuses, realised 
stock options and so on. One of these is the issue managed by Fearnley Fonds for 
Scorpion Offshore Ltd. in February 2008:  
“The purpose of the Prospectus is to increase the number of shares available for 
trading on Oslo Bourse to 54,131,928, since the number of shares issued within 
Hypothesis III: Specialists charge a higher fee for an equity issue than a non-
specialist. 
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the last 12 months amounts to more than the 10% threshold to issue a prospectus.” 
(Fearnley Fonds, 2008. p.6) 
 
One issue is left out because it mostly consisted of a convertible bond, without the 
possibility to identify the costs related to the equity issue. This leaves us with a 
sample of 174 observations. 
 
The period includes the phase just before, under and after the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. We have grouped the data into quarters in order to take account for 
seasonal shifts in demand and supply for equity. Also the data obtained elsewhere 
is arranged quarterly. 
 
The date of the issue, unless explicitly stated in the prospectus, is set to the date 
when the investor receives the ownership of the new stocks. In some issues there 
has been made two separate offers, i.e. to stockholders and employees for instance 
in two quarters. As the fees for these issues are stated net, we have set the date to 
the first issue. For the rights issues we have set the date to the end of the 
subscription period, as this is the ultimate date the stockholders can elect to 
participate in the issue and therefore is the day they obtain a legally binding right 
for the new shares. 
 
Some firms on Oslo Børs originate from countries such as Canada, Sweden etc. In 
the prospectus for some of these issues, the equity raised and fees are stated in 
their native currency. Unless any exchange rate to Norwegian kroner is stated in 
the prospectus, we have converted it to NOK by using the historical exchange rate 
on the day the shareholders received their share. The exchange rates are gathered 
from the national bank of Norway, Norges Bank. 
 
The prospects for the placements contain both the level of equity raised, and the 
direct costs of the placement. For rights issues the prospects are made ahead of the 
issue and distributed to the investors. The price range and number of stocks issued 
are therefore not known. In cases of uncertainty we have estimated the mid range 
of the size of the issue and the management fee. For the private placements, many 
of the prospects are made after the placement, and they state the actual amount 
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raised and the direct costs. We have, as far as possible, used the gross proceeds 
presented in the prospects as the “amount raised” in the placement or issue. If the 
gross or net proceed is not explicitly stated in the prospect, we have calculated the 
gross proceeds as: (number of shares issued x the subscription amount). In several 
of the prospects the fixed costs of printing and distributing the prospects, listing 
fees etc. are not included in the overall cost but comes in addition. We have not 
made any attempt to estimate such costs and add them to the total cost of the 
event, but instead noted that the true cost may be slightly higher than what we 
found. 
 
There have not been any significant changes in the fixed costs to Oslo Børs, VPS 
etc. in the period. Any changes in the price level are therefore attributed to 
changes in the fee to the managers. 
 
In the 174 placements and issues, there have been a total of 40 managers assisting 
with the events. Seven of the issues have been without any managers, as the 
issuers themselves have handled the event. On average there has been 1,68 
managers assisting in the placements or issues as they both compete and cooperate 
in raising the capital. Especially in the events where the firms headquarter is 
located abroad there are several managers, where foreign managers are brought in 
to focus on the foreign market and the Norwegian managers work with Norwegian 
investors. At most there were seven managers assisting in the same event. In order 
to measure market power and competition we us the same method as Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) used when analysing the IPO market. We measure the 
manager’s amount of capital raised in the various events and divide that amount 
with the total capital raised in the period. In the cases of two or more managers 
assisting in an event, we split the amount raised evenly between the managers for 
simplicity. This is not realistic, as a manager only assisting in one event, most 
likely, will not have the same network of investors as the more experienced 
managers. Thus, the market power of the largest managers may be larger than 
what we have estimated. By dividing the amount raised evenly between the 
respective managers, we limit the disturbance to the data with biased estimations 
of their contribution in events. Measuring market power in this manner might over 
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estimate the importance the manager has of contributing in large events, relative 
to several small ones. 
 
Graph 11 shows the amount raised in equity issues per quarter and the number of 
issues in the corresponding quarter. In Q1-2008 there were not any equity issues 
in our sample. Besides this quarter, the remainder of the financial crisis had 
approximately the same activity in raising equity through issues as the period 
immediately before the crisis and after. Q1-2006 and Q3-2009 are extreme 
observations, and the amount raised in Q3-2009, immediately after the financial 
crisis is driven by the 14 billion NOK issue in DNB. 
 
 
Graph 11: Amount raised and number of issues           Source: Prospects (Oslo Børs) 
 
We have summarized the observations for all managers in groups, depending on 
what kind of firm they are. This is necessary in order to make use of panel data for 
testing, which requires at least two observations of the same group at two different 
periods of time. There are too few managers participating in issues in every 
quarter for the panel data to give valid results. More on panel data will follow in 
the methodology section. The managers are grouped after their sector code found 
at Brønnøysundregistrene as: 
1. Financial institutions; firms that mainly operate in brokering stocks and 
bonds, corporate finance etc.  
2. Banks; if the manager is part of a corporation that has banking as their 
main activity.  
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3. Issuers; are the cases where the issuer performs the whole issuing 
themselves.  
4. Other foreigns; if the manager is a foreign firm not registered at 
Brønnøysundregistrene, and their main activity is different from a 
financial institutions. 
5. Foreigns; if the manager is a foreign financial institution, not registered in 
Brønnøysundregistrene through a Norwegian subsidiary. 
This grouping gives us five quarterly observations for “other foreign”, which is 
the lowest number of observations, up to 22 observations for “financial 
institutions”. This grouping simplifies the testing if, for example, financial 
institutions that specialize in SEOs can charge a higher price than other firms due 
to their expertise. 
In several of the issues there have been managers or stockholders guaranteeing to 
participate for an agreed amount in the issue. Thus, the issuer has been guaranteed 
a minimum amount that will be raised in the equity issue. As the guarantor takes 
on a lot of risk by guaranteeing in advance, without knowing the markets response 
to the issue, they demand compensation from the issuer to justify the additional 
exposure. The compensation is often a few percent of the amount they guarantee 
for. In many of the prospects the manager fee was inseparable from the other fees, 
and since this is a cost for the other investors, we have included these costs in our 
data. 
 
To control for inflation over the period, we use the inflation published by 
Statistics Norway and calculated the real values with first quarter 2006 as the 
base. 
 
In order to estimate the macro economical effects from changes in market 
conditions to the cost of raising equity, we have included the GDP, unemployment 
and the key rate set by Norges Bank. We have calculated the LOG, i.e. the change 
in the variables from quarter to quarter to control for the changes in the costs. All 
data in this purpose is gathered from Statistics Norway’s homepages. 
 
Finally, we have included the LOG of the value of Oslo Børs (OSEBX), in order 
to control for specific financial changes. As Malkiel (2003) points out: an efficient 
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market with free information reacts immediately to changes in the economic 
conditions and macro economic variables normally lag with some months. By 
including the stock exchange we can test hypothesis I; if there have been any 
changes in the level of costs in the period, and to what extent this is due to the 
financial crisis. The data on the stock index is gathered from Oslo Børs’ 
homepages. 
 
7. Methodology 
In this section we will describe the different methods we will use to test our 
hypothesis and why we have chosen these methods. 
 
7.1  Panel data 
Panel data is a set of data with repeated observations over the same units. In our 
specific thesis: groups of managers over a number of periods. We are interested in 
finding how the units behave, how their behaviour change over time, and if the 
units respond different to the same impulses, such as a shock to the economy. We 
compare the observations of the units over time with observed variable factors 
that we do believe have a significant impact on the unit’s behaviour. If there are 
systematic and significant covariance and correlations between the unit’s 
behaviour and the explanatory factors one can conclude that the factors have a 
systematic influence on how the units behave.  
 
The benefit of using multiple observations over a period of time is the possibility 
to estimate more realistic and complicated models than a cross-section or a single 
time series would do. However, with repeated observations one can usually not 
assume that the observations are independent of each other. Another flaw of panel 
data is the increased likelihood of missing data, because there normally will be 
periods without observations for some of the units (Verbeek, 2004). 
 
In order to perform a panel data test one needs to have at least two observations of 
a sample, and there cannot be more than one observation at any period of time. 
But then again, repeated observations of a unit lets us estimate changes on unit 
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level, and can explain why units behave differently in the different periods and 
why a unit behaves differently in two different periods of time (Verbeek, 2004). 
 
There are several variations of a panel data test available, depending on the data 
that is to be analysed. Especially the unobserved effects of the observed 
explanatory variables are important to evaluate before testing. The unobserved 
effects model (UEM), for a randomly drawn sample, can be written as follows: 
                                 
Where     is a 1×K matrix that can contain observable variables that change over 
time (t) but not over units (i), variables that change over i but not t or variables 
that change over both i and t.    is the unobserved effects of each individual and is 
often called the individual effect or individual heterogeneity.     Are the 
idiosyncratic errors as they across t as well as i (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
   can have both random and fixed effects depending on whether    is treated as a 
random variable or as a parameter to be estimated. With random effect it is meant 
that there is zero correlation between the unobserved effect and the observed 
explanatory variables, whereas with fixed effect one allows for correlation 
between the unobserved effects and the observed explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
We follow Verbeek (2004) and test our variables for heterogeneity with a 
Hausman test in order to find out if the unobserved effects are random or fixed. 
What the Hausman test does is that it tests if the fixed effect estimator and random 
effects estimator are significantly different, and if they are not, it is safe to use 
random effects. The Hausman test is calculated as: 
     
 
        
 
                      
               
Where    is the estimate of the true covariance matrices,      is the fixed effects 
estimator,      the random effects estimator. Under the null hypothesis, which 
implicitly says that plim(         ) = 0, the statistic    has an asymptotic 
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Chi-squared distribution with K degrees of freedom, where K is the number of 
elements in β (Verbeek, 2004). 
 
We find that the effects are not significantly different from each other, and 
conclude that we can use the random effects method. Random effects is a more 
efficient way of using the data than fixed effect, and is normally better for smaller 
samples such as ours, since the random effects use the between variation (       
in the data. However this only applies if   
  
 
   
     
    (Verbeek, 2004). 
 
The random effects model is written: 
                                        
              
      
   is the individual specific component that does not change over time, and     is a 
remainder component.    and     are assumed to be uncorrelated over time. 
Therefore, all correlation in the error terms over time is attributed to the individual 
effects of   . One assumes that    and     are mutually independent and 
independent of    . This implies that the ordinary least squares (OLS) for µ and β 
are unbiased and consistent. However, OLS is not the best way to compute the 
standard errors, as the error term         exhibits a special form of 
autocorrelation, unless   
   . It is therefore more efficient to calculate the 
generalized least squares (GLS) (Verbeek, 2004). See appendix 2 for more 
information about GLS. 
 
We divide the period into two, 2006-2008 and 2009-2011, in order to test if there 
has been any changes in the cost level that is due to development of processes, 
tools etc. We use dummy variables to separate the two time periods. 
 
We will use panel data to test if we can find explanatory variables for the cost 
level of issues in Norway for the period 2006-2011. We start by running a test 
with several macro variables; GDP, unemployment, the interest rate, the value of 
the stock market (OSEBX) and more issue specific variables such as the size of 
the amount raised. The formula we start by testing is: 
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In order to conclude which of explanatory variables have a significant impact on 
the direct cost level, we must look at the t- and p-values of the panel data 
regression. The t-value is the value of the test-of-significance. “Broadly speaking, 
a test of significance is a procedure by which sample results are used to verify the 
truth or falsity of a null hypothesis. The key idea behind the test of significance is 
that of a test statistics (estimator) and the sampling distribution of such a statistic 
under the null hypothesis. The decision to reject the    is made on the basis of the 
value of the test statistic obtained from the data at hand.” (Gujarati, 2003. p. 129) 
The t-value is calculated by the formula: 
   
      
       
  
            
 
 
  
This value follows the t distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom (Gujarati, 2003). 
The degrees of freedom for a panel data regression is calculated as: 
Degrees of freedom = NT – N – k, where k = # of x (Roberts, 2009). 
One then finds the corresponding critical value in a t-table, if the t-value of the 
test is larger than the critical value, then the explanatory factor is significant. 
 
“[...] the p-value (i.e. probability value), also known as the observed or exact level 
of significance or the exact probability of committing a Type I error. More 
technically, the p-value is defined as the lowest significance level at which the 
null hypothesis can be rejected.” (Gujarati, 2003. p. 137) As we test with a 95% 
confidence level, the p-value must be lower than 0,05 for us to conclude that the 
explanatory factor is significant. STATA reports the p-values in the results, but 
the value can also be found by looking it up in the t-table. 
 
We start by testing several variables at once, then remove the variables with the 
poorest fit, and rerun the test with reduced variables until we are left with only 
statistical significant explanatory variables. 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 55 
7.2  The endogeneity problem  
An explanatory variable is said to be endogenous if it is correlated with the 
disturbance term. Generally, in applied econometrics, the issue with endogeneity 
arises in one of three ways. First, it can be due to omitted variables. Omitted 
variables emerge as a consequence of data unavailability when one wants to 
control for one additional variable, but cannot include it in the regression. Second, 
endogeneity may occur as a measurement error. The measurement error arises 
when one tries to measure the partial effect of a variable, but we can only measure 
the effect imperfectly. Econometric endogeneity can also arise as simultaneity. 
This occurs when at least one of the explanatory variables is determined 
simultaneously along with your left-hand side variable (Wooldridge, 2003). 
According to Wooldridge (2003) the distinctions among the three possible 
occurrences are not always sharp. In some occasions you might even have more 
than one source of endogeneity.  
 
7.3  Two-sided mean compression test  
To test whether there are types of managers that charge a statistically significant 
higher price than the others, we will run a two-sided mean compression test with 
the quarterly aggregated mean fee in percent of amount raised. For each type of 
manager the test is done towards each other, in order to test if one or the other 
managers charge a lower fee in percent of the issue. 
 
A t-test is a test of significance, or the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis (   . 
The first step of a t-test is to calculate the value t for a sample: 
   
      
        
  
            
 
 
  
The variable t follows the t distribution with       degrees of freedom, under the 
normality assumption. Since the variable follows the t distribution, we can make a 
confidence-interval statement: 
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  is the value of    under   , and       ,       are the critical t values that 
decides the validity of the    (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
We form a   :       , i.e. that the fees charged by every type of manager is 
identical to the others. Our alternative hypothesis is therefore          . In the 
cases where the    does not hold, we must reject it and conclude that the fees are 
not identical. 
 
7.4  Concentration of market power 
The procedure of calculating    ,     and HHI is straightforward. To calculate 
    and     one simply adds together the market shares of the four or eight 
largest actors. HHI is calculated by squaring actors’ market share and add them 
together (Pepall et al., 2008). The calculation of each actor’s market share is 
explained in the data section. 
 
We do all our testing in Stata12, as it can handle both panel data and t-test. For 
simpler calculations, such as for competition, we use Excel. 
 
8. Empirical evidence and discussion 
In this section we will present and discuss the results of our tests. 
The results from our tests can be seen in appendix 3-8. 
 
8.1  The direct costs of equity issues 
The descriptive statistics of the complete sample can be seen in appendix 3. We 
see that the average cost in percent of the amount raised in the issue is 5,62 %. 
This means that for every million NOK the manager raise during the issue, the 
issuer must pay 56.200 NOK in fees to the manager, lawyers, Oslo Børs etc. The 
median of the sample is 4,67%. 
 
Graph 12 illustrates the distribution of the cost level. 86% of the issues lie within 
1-8% of the total amount raised. The minimum is 0,06%, which was only fixed 
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costs for an issue where the firm raised 543.600.000 NOK by themselves. The 
max is 62,5% of the amount raised, in that particular case only 800.000 NOK was 
raised. 
 
Graph 12: Distribution of cost in percent            Source: Prospects (Oslo Børs) 
 
The average costs we find are significantly lower than the average cost (14,6%) 
Ledaal (2009) found for Norwegian IPOs in the period 1998-2008. There was 
however some shortcomings to his study, such as a small sample over a longer 
period. The median Ledaal found, 7,3% is probably a better measure than the 
average, as he had two observations with 100% cost. As there is more uncertainty 
and work for the manager with assisting in an IPO, as the pricing and book 
building process is more complex, it is reasonable that the cost of a SEO is lower 
than for an IPO. 
 
Smith (1977), who is believed to be the first to analyse the gross fee of an SEO in 
an empirical environment, studied 578 US offerings from 1971 to 1975 and found 
an averaged fee of 5,02%. Small issues averaged at nearly 10%, whereas very 
large issues had an average of less than 4%. 
 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) followed up with the analysis of 1.249 US offerings 
from 1963 to 1981, and found an average of 6,09% for industrial issues and 
4,23% for utility issues. 
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Gao and Ritter (2010) analysed 3.276 US offerings from 1996 to 2007, and 
reports a gross fee average of 4,82%. 
 
The cost level for Norwegian SEOs lies somewhat above the results in the studies 
mentioned above. Several factors may contribute to this. For instance as the US 
studies we have found are getting out of date, and as we argued in section 5.2, 
developments made in communication and processing may have caused changes 
in the cost level. This should however lead to lower costs in our sample, than in 
the studies from 1970-1980s. Secondly, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 may 
skew our sample with abnormal equity issues, increased competition and 
increased risk. Third, the competition in the Norwegian market may be weaker 
than in the US. In our sample we get a    -estimate of 54,37% and a    -
estimate of 72,99%, both indicating a medium concentrated competition. The HHI 
of the sample is 914,92, and indicates an unconcentrated competition. As we 
presented in section 4.2, the profit of the actors in a Cournot competition 
decreases with the number of competitors. Therefore, if the competition in the US 
is higher than in Norway, this may pressure the managers to claim lower fees than 
in Norway. Fourth, the size of the issues in the US may on average be higher than 
in Norway, as it is reasonable to assume due to the size of the US market and US 
firms. In the presence of economies of scale, this will lead to a lower degree of 
direct costs in percent of the amount raised. Fifth, as the US economy is the 
largest in the world (CNN, 2013 and Economy Watch, 2013) the numbers of 
investors, both national and foreign, are significantly higher than in Norway. And 
therefore many of the largest managers in the US have a vast global network and 
customers. This may make the process of raising similar amount of equity in the 
US relatively more efficient than in Norway, explaining the difference in the cost 
level. 
 
8.2  Development of costs 
Hypothesis I: There have been significant changes in the direct costs of an equity 
issue in the period 2006-2011. 
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In our panel data, the time variable is not a significant explanatory variable for 
how much of the amount raised is charged as fees. We have also tested with a 
dummy variable, dividing the period in two, 2006-2008 and 2009-2011. This 
dummy variable is not significant either. Hence, we cannot conclude that there has 
been changes in the cost level due to development of markets, tools etc. The 
results can be seen in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Panel data test: Time variable 
 
We do, however find that the level of OSEBX is a significant variable on the 
amount charged in percent of the amount raised. As there have been large 
fluctuations in the value of OSEBX over the period, this may corrupt the test of 
the time variable. Our result suggests that the average fee charged drops with 
0,00861 percentage points per 100 points the OSEBX rises with. The result is 
shown in table 2 above. Graph 13 shows the development of OSEBX over the 
period.  
                                                                              
         rho     .0192744   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02226262
     sigma_u    .00312099
                                                                              
       _cons     .0865199   .0152829     5.66   0.000      .056566    .1164739
        Time     .0025463   .0063212     0.40   0.687    -.0098431    .0149357
  Raisedreal    -3.82e-12   1.30e-12    -2.95   0.003    -6.36e-12   -1.28e-12
      OBXprQ    -.0000943   .0000417    -2.26   0.024    -.0001761   -.0000125
                                                                              
       Feein        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =         .
                                                Wald chi2(2)       =         .
       overall = 0.1817                                        max =        22
       between = 0.1097                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1831                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Managertype                     Number of groups   =         5
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        65
. xtreg Feein OBXprQ Raisedreal Time, re
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Graph 13: Value OSEBX 2006-2011                  Source: Oslo Børs 
 
The black line to the far left in the graph shows that the OSEBX increased with 
approximately 100 points in the period Q1-2006 until Q2-2007. In this period the 
average cost of an equity issue did therefore fall. During the financial crisis, there 
was a fall of roughly 200 points on the OSEBX. Our result tells that the cost of 
raising capital increased in this period, and should have increased by nearly twice 
as much as the fall in the period Q1-2006 – Q2-2007. From the end of the 
financial crisis, the OSEBX rose with approximately 100 points, and the costs of 
raising equity fell. 
 
This fact, that there are increasing costs in a period with an increasing volatility, 
fits well with our postulation that Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) assumption of 
rational investors and perfect information does not hold, as presented in section 
4.1.2.6.3 and argued in section 5.2. The increased fees charged by the managers 
might suggest that they exploit the imperfections in the market, or it can be that 
the managers demand a higher risk premium for the issue. The risk of not being 
able to raise enough capital in a recession or misprice the stocks is severe. As 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) argued, damaging their reputation can be costly for the 
managers, and the managers may therefore have increased their prices to justify 
their participation in the issue. 
 
One can argue that there was approximately the same level of equity raised during 
the financial crisis as both before and after, if one disregards Q1-2006 and Q3-
2009. There were however a larger number of issues in Q3-2009. This indicates a 
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lower amount raised per issue, meaning that any economies of scale are lower and 
that the issues therefore are somewhat more expensive in that period. If we 
assume that the investors demand for equity issues was unchanged during the 
financial crisis, as well as the capacity of the managers to assist in issues, the 
increasing amount of issues can explain the increased price in the period, ref 
graph 6 and 7. This effect is amplified if we assume that the investors are risk 
averse and reduced their demand for stocks during the most volatile periods. This 
can be illustrated with an outward shift of the supply curve and an inward shift of 
the demand curve in graph 5. 
 
As mentioned, Q3-2009 was an extreme case of equity being raised through 
SEOs, and was a direct consequence of the financial crisis. Our finding of a 
slightly higher activity during the recession contradicts the findings of Eckbo and 
Mausalis (1995) to some degree. We do find the same effect, namely that 
increased demand for issues leads to higher prices. However, in our sample the 
activity increased during the recession and in their sample it was during the 
expansion period. As we mentioned in section 5.2, consensus has not been made, 
if the recession really is over. This can therefore suggest that our period consists 
of mainly a recession, and this may affect our findings, as we cannot compare 
within the sample. 
 
 8.3  Economies of scale 
Hypothesis II: There are economies of scale in equity issues in Norway, and they 
are increasing with the size of the issue. 
 
Our results confirm that fees in percent of amount raised falls with the size of the 
issue. In fact, our test indicates that the fees in percent falls with 0,366 percentage 
points per billion NOK raised in the issue. This indicates a relative savings for the 
issuer, of 36.600 NOK per billion raised, due to economies of scale. This result 
can be seen in table 2 above. 
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The existence of economies of scale in SEOs in Norway is supported by the 
previous findings of Smith (1977), Lee et al. (1996) and Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2000) in other markets.  
We do find some support for a u-shaped spread in Norwegian SEOs. If we group 
our findings by size and take their average costs we find a falling relationship 
between size and cost, but issues over 1 billion NOK are somewhat more 
expensive than issues between 500 million to 1 billion NOK. The average number 
of managers for issues over 1 billion NOK is 2,87. For the total sample the 
average is 1,68. Also, the presence of foreign managers is higher for the issues 
over 1 billion NOK, than for the smaller ones. This indicates that the market and 
network of the managers in Norway is too small for such issues. As Corwin and 
Schultz (2005) found, the manager spread tends to increase with the number of 
managers. One reason for this is diseconomies of scale, as each manager competes 
between themselves for the same investors etc. As the market is small and the 
competition for the investors increase, then the book building necessarily takes 
longer time and become more costly.  
 
The intervals of equity raised we have made are asymmetric, as more than 1/5 of 
all issues in the period were smaller than 50 million NOK. Further, 1/3 is below 
100 million NOK, and 3/5 is below 250 million NOK. Making more (fewer) 
intervals with smaller (larger) range would not illustrate the effects as clearly as 
the intervals we have set up. Graph 14 clearly illustrates the presence of 
economies of scale in Norwegian SEOs. 
 
 
Graph 14: Average direct cost of raising capital           Source: Prospects (Oslo Børs) 
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8.4  Specialists 
Hypothesis III: Specialists charge a higher fee for an equity issue than a non-
specialist. 
 
By running a two-sample mean comparison test of the average cost charged by the 
different types of managers we get the following results: 
 Foreign financial institutions and other foreign are significantly more 
expensive managers than financial institutions, banks and issuer.  
 We cannot clearly reject the   , that the cost other foreign is equal to 
foreign financial institutions, but there are indications of other foreign 
being more expensive. 
 We cannot reject the   , for the cost level charged by a bank, financial 
institution or for the firm performing the issue themselves. 
 
 
Table 3: Two-sample mean comparison test: Financial institutions = Foreign financial institution 
 
Foreign firms have been a significantly more expensive manager than Norwegian 
managers, in the period 2006-2011. The results from this test can be seen in table 
3 above. We characterised Norwegian financial institutions as specialists for 
raising equity for firms listed on Oslo Børs. Contradicting to hypothesis III, 
Norwegian financial institutions are less expensive than their foreign 
counterparties. We presented Corwin and Schultz (2005) claim, that co-managers 
are included in the issue due to their complementary abilities of the lead manager, 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0238         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0476          Pr(T > t) = 0.9762
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       32
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Foreign)                        t =  -2.0596
                                                                              
    diff              -.016543    .0080321               -.0329039   -.0001821
                                                                              
combined        34    .0456515    .0040226    .0234553    .0374675    .0538354
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    .0563558    .0090948    .0315054    .0363382    .0763734
Financ~l        22    .0398128    .0033262    .0156015    .0328955    .0467301
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Foreign, unpaired
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in section 4.1.2.6.1. The foreign financial institutions and other foreign managers 
are most likely brought in as co-managers due to their size of and complementary 
network of global investors or their specific industry expertise, such as in the 
examples we presented on page 19.   
 
Further, in the light of the findings of Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
that we presented in section 4.1.2.6.1, we see that besides having a larger network 
and therefore easier access to capital and/or desirable industry knowledge, many 
of the foreign financial institutions are highly reputable worldwide. Take for 
instance Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citibank, J.P. Morgan or Morgan 
Stanley, all some of the largest financial institutions in the world and a reputation 
for being the biggest and best within their fields. All of the above, co-managed 
one equity issue each in Norway in the period 2006-2011. Besides their 
undisputable access to capital, these institutions reputation can be interpreted as a 
solid guarantee for the quality of any firm. This applies specially for a Norwegian 
firm that is relatively small in the global context.   
 
The findings above indicate that although the foreign managers are not considered 
specialist for raising equity in Norway, many of them are so in their market. That, 
together with their desirable complementary attributes to the Norwegian 
specialists, brings them a position where they can charge a higher fee, than the 
Norwegian managers. 
 
There is no significant difference between the cost levels of Norwegian managers 
and the issuer. This is puzzling, why would the issuer raise all the money 
themselves if they cannot do it any cheaper than the banks or financial 
institutions? The firm would be better off focusing on its main activities, as this is 
where they generate profit. We believe that the reason is due to economies of 
scale. Financial institutions that specialize in this type of activity should clearly 
outperform the issuer. In the period 2006-2011, financial institutions raised 68,93 
billion NOK through equity issues. This is 2/3 of the equity raised in the period. 
Banks raised 16,55 billion NOK, approximately 17,3% of all the equity raised. 
The average equity raised for a financial institution in an issue is 318 million 
NOK, and 250 million NOK by banks. The issuer only raised an average of 100 
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million NOK, with a median of only 23,8 million NOK. Running a two-sample 
mean comparison test, we conclude that the issuer raise statistical significantly 
less than the specialists per issue. We therefore draw the conclusion that due to the 
proven existence of economies of scale in SEOs, firms can manage the issue 
relatively cheaper themselves, than through a bank or financial institution. At least 
under certain conditions, such as experienced board of managers, good 
profitability forecast, good knowledge and communication with the stockholders. 
 
As we can see in table 4 below, we do not find any significant difference in the 
cost level between Norwegian banks and Norwegian financial institutions. 
 
Table 4: Two-sample mean comparison test: Financial institutions = Banks 
 
8.5  Shortcomings 
We are aware that our study has several shortcomings. First of all the time period 
is only six years, which often is considered too short a period to be able to 
generalize. We feel confident that our choice of shortening our period to be able to 
cover all issues in the period gives more reliable results than a more longitudinal 
with a more random sample. Second, the period includes the recession during the 
financial crisis, which leads to extreme results as the market was in distress.  
 
Third, the way be group our managers into units to perform our panel data is not 
optimal, as it would be of more interest to have a finer diversification of the 
managers. Preferably we would have investigated each manager separately, that 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2860         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5721          Pr(T > t) = 0.7140
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       40
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Bank)                           t =  -0.5697
                                                                              
    diff             -.0029916    .0052514                -.013605    .0076218
                                                                              
combined        42    .0412374     .002601    .0168564    .0359845    .0464902
                                                                              
    Bank        20    .0428044    .0041181    .0184169     .034185    .0514238
Financ~l        22    .0398128    .0033262    .0156015    .0328955    .0467301
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Bank, unpaired
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way we could have tested for overpricing by the managers with the highest market 
powers, and if any managers specialize in raising capital for certain industries and 
therefore can charge a higher price for issues in that sector. Due to too few 
observations on each manager, this was not possible.  
 
Fourth, the fact that we do not know how much each manager was able to raise 
when there were several managers cooperating in an issue or how much each 
manager charged in fees, but we simply divided it equally among the managers 
means that some mangers may have been credited for too much capital raised 
and/or too little fees charged.  This only affects our hypothesis regarding 
specialists, but the main research question and the other two hypotheses are valid.  
 
Finally, we have the problem of endogeneity. There are obviously many variables 
that affect the cost level of equity issues. Due to the scope and availability of the 
data we could not test for more variables. We do however believe that we have 
tested for the most relevant and important factors. Similarly, in most time series 
analyses there are problems of autocorrelation. Many of the variables we have 
used in our testing are correlated with the development in the preceding periods, 
and this leads to measurement errors. Correlation between the variables and the 
error terms could also lead to measurement errors. In the end, this could lead to 
over/underestimation of the effect from the different variables. As a consequence 
the test results may have led us to discard explanatory variables, which should 
have been included. 
 
9. Conclusion 
As for the answer to our main research question: “How high are the direct costs of 
a stock issue for a firm listed on the Norwegian stock exchange”? We have found 
the direct costs of raising equity to be 5,62% of the amount raised. This is 
somewhat above what similar studies have found in the US-market. A likely 
explanation for this is that there are more potential for economies of scale in the 
US, due to the size of the firms, issues and the market.  
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We conclude that there have been significant changes in the fees charged for an 
equity issue in the period 2006-2011. The economy has moved from expansion to 
recession and to a recovery stage in the period. We have proved that the cost level 
changed due to changes in the economic conditions, and not due to increased 
efficiency in managing the issues. We found that the cost of raising equity is 
negatively correlated with the changes in the value of Oslo Børs. When the stock 
index raises the cost of an equity issue falls and vice versa. Our analyses suggests 
that the direct cost in percent of the amount raised, falls with 0,00861 percentage 
points per 100 points increase in the OSEBX. 
 
There are economies of scale when raising equity through a SEO. We found that 
there are positive economies of scale up to a certain level. For the largest issues, 
we found increasing costs indicating diseconomies of scale. We measured the 
effect of the economies of scale to be a fall of 0,366 percentage points per billion 
NOK raised, of the degree of direct cost to the amount raised. 
 
The three results above give us the following formula for the percentage direct 
cost of the amount raised: 
 
                                                                               
                
              
   
 
We found evidence that the issuer raises smaller amount of equity cheaper 
themselves, than any of the manager types. Raising the capital themselves is only 
logical for the investors if they can do so by more efficiently than the market. We 
also found that foreign managers have desirable attributes that compliment the 
Norwegian managers. Due to their specialities they charge a higher fee than the 
Norwegian managers. We did not find any support for the hypothesis that 
managers specialising in raising equity for firms listed on Oslo Børs charge a 
higher fee than their competitors. 
 
One can understand that the cost of raising equity in Norway is more expensive 
than in the US. It is not surprising that the cost level of raising equity through an 
SEO behaves as predicted by theory, i.e. that there are scale economies and that 
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the cost level moves up and down with changing market conditions. We do 
however leave it up to the reader to decide whether the cost level in the 
Norwegian market is at an appropriate level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 69 
10. Reference list 
Altinkilic, Oya and Hansen, Robert S. 2000. “Are There Economies of Scale in 
Underwriting Fees Evidence of Rising External Financing Costs?” The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol 13, No 1: pp. 191-218. 
 
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., Taylor, D. J. and Verrecchia, R. E. 2010. “When 
Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital?”. Journal of Accounting 
Research. Vol. 49 No. 1: pp. 1-40. 
 
ASX Group. 2010. “Capital Raising In Australia - Experiences and Lessons from 
the Global Financial Crisis”. Sydney: ASX Group.  
http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/20100129_asx_information_paper_cap
ital_raising_in_australia.pdf Accessed 13.07.2012. 
 
Baruch, Bernard M. 1955. “The Stock Market Functions as an Index - Reflects the 
Peoples' Confidence in Business and Government Policies and World Conditions” 
Vital Speeches of the Day Vol. 21 Issue 14: pp. 1195-1198 
 
Barolotti, Bernardo, Megginson, William and Smart, Scott B.. 2008. “The rise of 
accelerated seasoned equity offerings”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
Vol 20, No. 3: pp. 35-57. 
 
Beatty, Randolph and Ritter, Jay R. 1986. “Investment banking, reputation, and 
the underpricing of initial public offerings”. Journal of Financial Economics. 
Issue: 15, pp. 213-232. 
 
Berk, Jonathan and DeMarzo, Peter. 2007. Corporate Finance. Pearson 
International Edition. 
 
Bertrand, J. 1883. “Book review of theorie mathematique de la richesse sociale 
and of recherches sur les principles mathematiques de la theorie des richesses”. 
Journal de Savants. Issue: 67: pp. 499-508. 
 
Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/sorry-but-europe-s-
economic-crisis-is-not-over.html Accessed: 13.08.2013 
 
Bloomberg Professional 
 
Brenner, S. H. 2005. “Hotelling games with three, four, and more players”. 
Journal of regional science. Issue: 45, pp. 851-864. 
 
Brau, James C. and Fawcett, Stanley E. 2006. Evidence on What CFOs Think 
About the IPO Process: Practice, Theory, and Managerial Implications. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance. Morgan Stanley. Vol. 18 No. 3 Summer 2006: pp: 
107-117 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 70 
Bowen, Robert M., Chen, Xia and Cheng, Qiang. 2008. “Analyst Coverage and 
the Cost of Raising Equity Capital - Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned 
Equity Offerings”. Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 25 No. 3: pp. 657-
699. 
 
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC). 1993. 
Understanding the Underwriting Spread. California: CDIAC.  
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/issuebriefs/031993.pdf Accessed 10.04.2013. 
 
Chen, K.C. and Wu, Lifan. 2002. “Cost of Raising Capital – Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) – in Hong Kong”. 
Journal of Financial Management and Analysis 15(2): pp. 27-36. 
 
CNBC, Article series. 2012. ”Boom, Bust & Blame. The Inside Story of 
America’s Economic Crisis”. http://www.cnbc.com/id/100001231  
Accessed:  01.07.2013 
 
CNN, 2013. “World’s largest economies”. 
http://money.cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/  
Accessed: 20.08.2013 
 
Cochrane, John H. 2000. Asset Pricing. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press 
 
Conte, Christopher, Karr, Al, Clark, George, Hug, Kathleen E. and Manning, 
Lisa. 2001. Outline of the U.S. economy. 1st ed. United States. Dept. of state 
Office of International information. 
 
Corwin, S. A. 2003. The Determinants of Underpricing for Seasoned Equity 
Offers. Journal of Finance, Issue 58, pp. 2249-2279. 
Corwin, Shane A. and Schultz, Paul. 2005. “The Role of IPO Underwriting 
Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition”. The 
Journal of Finance Vol. LX, No. 1: pp. 443-486. 
 
Deloitte. 2012. Positive fremtidsutsikter, men finansieringsbildet er i endring.  
Oslo: Deloitte.  
http://www.deloitte.com/view/no_NO/no/innsikt/publikasjoner/a1121f319860a310
VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD.htm Accessed 08.01.2013. 
 
Diamond, Douglas W. 1984. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated 
Monitoring”. Review of Economic Studies pp. 393-414. 
 
Eckbo. B. E., Masulis, R. W. and Norli, Ø. 2007. Security Offerings. In: Eckbo, 
B. E. (ed.) Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance. San Diego: Elsevier. 
 
Eckbo, Espen and Masulis, Ronald W. 1992. “Adverse Selection and the Rights 
Offer Paradox”. Journal of Financial Economics. Issue 32: pp. 293-332. 
 
Eckbo, Espen and Masulis, Ronald W. 1995. “Seasoned Equity Offerings - A 
Survey”. Finance: pp. 1017-1072. 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 71 
Economics Online. 
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Oligopoly.html 
Accessed: 12.08.2013 
 
Economy Watch, 2013. “US Economy”. 
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/usa/?page=full  
Accessed: 20.08.2013 
 
Emmons, William R., Gilbert R. A. and Yeager, T. J. 2001. “The Importance of 
Scale Economies and Geographic Diversification in Community Bank Mergers”. 
Working Paper Series, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 2001. 
 
E24. 2012. “Aksjemeglere taper for robothandel”. 
http://e24.no/boers-og-finans/aksjemeglerne-taper-for-robothandel/20152087 
Accessed: 21.08.2013 
 
Fearnley Fonds. 2008. “Scorpion Offshore Ltd. - Prospectus” 
 
First Energy Capital, 2013. “About us”  
http://www.firstenergy.com/page.php?p_id=2&s_id=62&page_type=1  
Accessed: 20.08.2013 
 
Gao, X and Ritter, J. R. 2010. “The marketing of seasoned equity offerings”. 
Journal of Financial Economics. Issue 97: pp. 33-52. 
 
Geddes, R. 2005. Secondary equity offerings. IPOs and Equity Offerings. Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Gonnard, Eric, Kim, Eun Jung and Ynesta, Isabelle. 2008. “Recent trends in 
institutional investors statistics”. Financial Market Trends. OECD 2008. 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42143444.pdf Accessed 
08.04.2013. 
 
Gujarati, Damodar N. 2003. Basic Econometrics.  4th  Ed. Mc Graw Hill 
 
Hansen, R. S. 2001. Do investment banks compete in IPOs?: the advent of the 
“7% plus contract”. Journal of Financial Economics. Issue: 59, pp. 313- 346. 
 
Hellwig, Martin. 1980. “On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive 
Markets.” Journal of Economic Theory. Issue 22, pp. 477-498. 
 
Hellwig, Martin. 1998. “Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an 
Economy”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol. 154: pp. 328-
345 
 
Homer, Sidney and Sylla, Richard. 1996. A History of Interest Rates. 3rd ed. 
Rutgers 
 
Hotelling, H. 1929. “Stability in competition”. Economic Journal. Issue: 39, pp. 
41-57. 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 72 
Huang, R. and Zhang, D. 2011. Managing Underwriters and the Marketing of 
Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis. Issue: 
46, pp. 141-170. 
 
Hume, Susan R and Sharma, Rajneesh. 2009. “A Study of Russian Equity 
Offerings - How Important is the Underwriter?”. Journal of International Finance 
and Economics Vol. 9 No. 2: pp. 68-76.  
 
Ibbotson, R. G. and Ritter, J. R. 1995. Chapter 30 Initial public offerings. In: R.A. 
Jarrow, V.M. & Ziemba, W.T. (eds.) Handbooks in Operations Research and 
Management Science. Elsevier. 
 
Investopedia. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwriter.asp  
Accessed: 12.08.2013 
 
Jarnecic, Elvis and Liu, Yubo. 2013. “Equity issues and the impact of lead 
manager affiliation on broker market share and trading volume” Global 
Conference on Business and Finance Proceedings Vol. 8 No. 1: pp. 332-342. 
 
Jeon, J.Q. and Ligon, J. A. 2011. The role of co-managers in reducing flotation 
costs: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Banking & Finance. 
Issue: 35, pp. 1041-1056. 
 
Kai Dai. 2012. Liquidity Shocks and SEO Underpricing. Doctoral thesis; 
University of Nottingham. 
http://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/2627/1/Kai's_PhD_Thesis.pdf Accessed 
17.06.2013. 
 
Kim, D., Palia, D. and Saunders, A. 2010. Are Initial Returns and Underwriting 
Spreads in Equity Issues Complements or Substitutes? Financial Management 
(Blackwell Publishing Limited). Issue: 39, pp. 1403-1423. 
 
Lambert, R and Verrecchia, R. 2010. Cost of capital in imperfect competition 
settings. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Ledaal, Torjus. 2009. Analyse av kostnader ved børsintroduksjoner på Oslo Børs, 
1998-2008. Master’s thesis; Universitetet i Agder, Kristiansand. 
http://brage.bibsys.no/hia/handle/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_10430 Accessed 
01.02.2013. 
 
Lee, Inmoo, Lochhead, Scott, Ritter, Jay and Zhao, Quanshui. 1996. “The Costs 
of Raising Capital”. The Journal of Financial Research Vol. XIX, No. 1: pp. 59-
74. 
 
Loderer, Claudio F., Sheenhan, Dennis P. and Kadlec, Gregory B., 1991. “The 
Pricing of equity offerings”. Journal of Financial Economics, 29: pp. 35-57. 
 
Luis Correira da Silva, Leonie Bell and Agris Preimanis. November 2006. The 
Cost of Raising Capital: An International Comparison. Oxera. London: Oxera. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/events/2006/workshop271106/p6_luis_corre
ia_da_silva_workshop_presentation_271106.pdf Accessed: 13.07.2012. 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 73 
Malkiel, B.G. 2003. “The efficient market hypothesis and its critics”. The journal 
of economic perspectives. Vol. 17, 1: pp. 59-82. 
 
Masulis, Chloe H. and Nanda, V. 1993. Common Stock Offerings Across the 
Business Cycle: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Empirical Finance. Issue: 1, pp. 
3-31. 
 
McLaughlin, Robyn, Safieddine, Assem and Vasudevan, Gopala K. 2000. 
“Investment Banker Reputation and the Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers”. 
Financial Management pp. 96-110. 
 
Megginson, William L. and Weiss, Kathleen A.. 1991. “Venture Capitalist 
Certification in Initial Public Offerings”. The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVI, No. 
3, pp. 879-903. 
 
Modigliani, Franco and Miller, Merton H.. 1958. “The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”.  The American Economic 
Review Vol 48, No. 3: pp. 261-297.  
 
Modigliani, Franco and Miller, Merton H.. 1963. “Corporate Income Taxes and 
the Cost of Capital: A Correction”.  The American Economic Review Vol 53, No. 
3: pp. 433-443.  
 
Mola, S. and Loughran T. 2004. Discounting and Clustering in Seasoned Equity 
Offering Prices. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis. Issue 39, pp. 1-23. 
 
Moon, John J. 2006. “Public vs. Private Equity”. Journal of Applied Corprate 
Finance Vol. 18, No. 3: pp. 76-82. 
 
Moore, Geoffrey H. 1980. Business Cycles, inflation and forecasting. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Business Cycles. Issue: 24. 
 
Mukesh, Kr. Singh. 2008. Book Building Process. Accessed: 12.08.2013. 
 
Myers, Stewart C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of finance. Issue: 
39, pp. 575-592. 
 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. 1984. “Corporate financing and investment 
decisions when firms have information that investors do not have.” Journal of 
Financial Economics Issue 13: pp. 187-221. 
 
Norges Bank. http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/valutakurser/  
Accessed: 21.05.2013 
 
Norstad, John. 1999. An Introduction to Utility Theory. Illinois: Norstad. 
http://www.norstad.org/finance/util.pdf Accessed: 08.04.2013. 
 
Oslo Børs. http://www.oslobors.no/Oslo-Boers/Statistikk  
Accessed: 08.04.2013 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 74 
Pagano, Marco, Panetta, Fabio and Zingales, Luigi. 1998. “Why do Companies go 
Public? An Empirical Analysis”. The Journal of Finance Vol. LIII, No. 1: pp. 27-
64. 
 
Pagano, Marco and Röell, Ailsa. 1998. “The Choice of Stock Ownership 
Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to go Public”. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1998 pp. 187-225. 
 
Pepall, Lynne, Ricards, Dan and Norman, George, 2008. Industrial Organization: 
Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications. 4th ed. Blackwell Publishing. 
 
PwC (Price Waterhouse Cooper). 2012. Considering an IPO? The costs of going 
and being public may surprise you. PWC’s Deals practice. USA: PWC.  
http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-
of-ipo.pdf Accessed: 21.12.2012.  
 
Reitan, Bjørnar and Sørheim, Roger. 2000. “The informal venture capital market 
in Norway – investor characteristics, behaviour and investment preferences”. 
Venture Capital. Vol. 2 No.2: pp 129-141. 
 
Roberts, Michael R.. 2009. “Linear Panel Data Models”. 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/teaching_files/fin926/Lecture%20Sli
des/Linear%20Panel%20Data%20Models%20Slides.pdf Department of Finance, 
The Warton School University of Pennsylvania. Accessed: 24.08.2013. 
 
Rock, K. 1986. Why new issues are underpriced. Journal of Financial Economics, 
Issue: 15, pp. 187-212. 
 
Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R.W. and Jaffe, J. F. 2006. Corporate Finance 7th ed. 
Boston, Mass., McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1939. A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of 
the Capitalist Process. McGraw-Hill 
 
Securities and Exchange Board of India. 
http://www.icai.org/resource_file/10346676-683.pdf Accessed: 12.08.2013 
 
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1904. Library of 
Economics and Liberty. 
 
Smith jr., Clifford W. 1977. “Alternative methods for raising capital Rights versus 
underwritten offerings”. Journal of Financial Economics 5: pp. 273-307. 
 
Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB) http://ssb.no.  
Accessed: 08.04.2013. 
 
Stulz, Rene M. 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. 
Journal of Financial Economics. Issue: 26, pp. 3-28. 
 
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 75 
The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/mar/25/mervyn-king-
crisis-not-over 
Accessed: 13.08.2013 
 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal 
Trade Commission, 2010. “Horizontal Merger Guidlines”. 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html  
Accessed: 22.08.2013 
 
Verbeek, Marno. 2008. A Guide to Modern Econometrics. 3rd ed. John Wiley and 
Sons Ltd. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel 
Data. The MIT Press 
  
Master thesis in GRA 19003   02.09.2013 
 
Page 76 
11. Appendices 
Appendix 1 
 
Prudential's IPO syndicate 
  Bank Shares underwritten   Role 
    Goldman, Sachs & Co. 19 109 063 
 
Book runner and lead manager 
Prudential Securities, Inc. 8 175 000 
 
Co-lead manager 
   Credit Suisse First Boston Corp 6 450 000 
 
Senior manager 
Deutche Bank 6 948 750 
  Lehman Brothers 5 722 500 
  Merrill Lynch 6 540 000 
  Morgan Stanley 5 559 000 
  Salomon Smith Barney 5 559 000 
  The Williams Capital Group 6 131 250 
    Bank of America Securities 2 248 125 
 
Junior manager 
Bear, Stearns & Co 2 145 937 
  Blaylock & Partners 2 248 125 
  First Union Securities 1 635 000 
  Ramirez & Co 1 962 000 
  UBS Warburg 1 226 250 
    ABN AMRO 500 000 
 
Major bracket manager 
Allen & Co 500 000 
  BNY Capital Markets 500 000 
  A.G. Edwards & Sons 500 000 
  . 500 000 
  . 500 000 
  . 500 000 
  . 500 000 
  . 500 000 
    Advest Inc. 250 000 
 
Manager 
M.R. Beal 250 000 
  Chatsworth Securities 250 000 
  City National Bank of New Jersey 250 000 
  . 250 000 
  . 250 000 
  . 250 000 
  . 250 000 
  . 250 000 
  . 250 000 
  . 250 000 
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Appendix 2 
 
Generalized least squares 
A generalized least squares (GLS) estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator 
for β in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The advantage of deriving a 
GLS-estimator is that one does not need to estimate a new covariance matrix or 
estimator for   , but one can simply use the OLS results and replace the variables. 
The covariance matrix for the GLS is smaller than for the OLS, since the GLS 
estimator has a smaller variance than its OLS counterparty. (Marno Verbeek, 
2004) 
 
To derive the GLS-estimator one should first note that the error terms for unit i 
can be stacked as         1. The covariance matrix of the vector is;  
                 
     
     
    
2 
If we multiply from the vectors in the random effects model with     from the 
left we get: 
       
        
 
 
    
    
 
 
    
    
    
 
 
    
 , transforms the data in deviations from individual means while 
 
 
    
  
takes individual means, and therefore the GLS estimator can be derived as 
follows;  
                             
                     
      
 
   
 
   
  
 
                                          
 
   
 
   
 
     
(Marno Verbeek, 2004) 
 
 
 
                                                 
1               of dimension T and                 
2    is the identity matrix of dimension T 
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Appendix 3 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 Max raised 14 007 670 135,80 
Min raised 800 000,00 
Average 548 841 642,47 
Median 182 250 000,00 
Std dev 1 407 789 252,34 
Kurtosis 59,19 
Skewness 7,09 
Sum 95 498 445 789,68 
Max total fee 211 000 000,00 
Min total fee 140 000,00 
Average 18 285 269,11 
Median 8 050 000,00 
Std dev 31 537 544,04 
Kurtosis 16,80 
Skewness 3,81 
Sum 3 181 636 825,45 
Max fee % 62,50 % 
Min fee % 0,06 % 
Average 5,62 % 
Median 4,67 % 
Std dev 5,38 % 
Average +/- 2*std dev 16,39 % 
  -5,14 % 
Kurtosis 72,42 
Skewness 7,16 
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Appendix 4 
 
Hausman test 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Test result, fixed effects 
 
 
  
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =    -2.38    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  Raisedreal     -4.26e-12    -4.18e-12       -7.90e-14        6.19e-13
  LOGKeyRate     -.0030305    -.0039012        .0008707        .0005268
      OBXprQ     -.0000775    -.0000671       -.0000104               .
   LOGunempl      .0045405     .0112271       -.0066866               .
      LOGBNP     -.6606232    -.6168279       -.0437953               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (4) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (5); be sure this is
. . hausman fixed random
F test that all u_i=0:     F(4, 55) =     2.11               Prob > F = 0.0915
                                                                              
         rho    .22554206   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02227052
     sigma_u    .01201836
                                                                              
       _cons      .750649   .5249778     1.43   0.158      -.30143    1.802728
  Raisedreal    -4.26e-12   1.45e-12    -2.94   0.005    -7.16e-12   -1.36e-12
  LOGKeyRate    -.0030305   .0116165    -0.26   0.795    -.0263104    .0202494
      OBXprQ    -.0000775   .0000523    -1.48   0.144    -.0001823    .0000272
   LOGunempl     .0045405   .0337672     0.13   0.894    -.0631305    .0722115
      LOGBNP    -.6606232   .5009021    -1.32   0.193    -1.664453     .343207
                                                                              
       Feein        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0295                        Prob > F           =    0.0184
                                                F(5,55)            =      2.99
       overall = 0.2144                                        max =        22
       between = 0.1624                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2140                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Managertype                     Number of groups   =         5
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        65
. xtreg Feein LOGBNP LOGunempl OBXprQ LOGKeyRate Raisedreal, fe
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Appendix 6 
Test result, random effects 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02227052
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     .6975927   .5396712     1.29   0.196    -.3601433    1.755329
  Raisedreal    -4.18e-12   1.31e-12    -3.19   0.001    -6.75e-12   -1.61e-12
  LOGKeyRate    -.0039012   .0116045    -0.34   0.737    -.0266456    .0188433
      OBXprQ    -.0000671   .0000539    -1.24   0.213    -.0001729    .0000386
   LOGunempl     .0112271   .0345049     0.33   0.745    -.0564012    .0788554
      LOGBNP    -.6168279   .5154668    -1.20   0.231    -1.627124    .3934684
                                                                              
       Feein        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =         .
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =         .
       overall = 0.2163                                        max =        22
       between = 0.2080                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2118                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Managertype                     Number of groups   =         5
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        65
. xtreg Feein LOGBNP LOGunempl OBXprQ LOGKeyRate Raisedreal, re
                                                                              
         rho    .31362214   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02279048
     sigma_u    .01540548
                                                                              
       _cons     .0850837   .0160351     5.31   0.000     .0536554     .116512
 RaisedRBill    -.0036608   .0016386    -2.23   0.025    -.0068723   -.0004492
      OBXprQ     -.000086   .0000375    -2.30   0.022    -.0001595   -.0000126
                                                                              
       Feein        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0088
                                                Wald chi2(2)       =      9.46
       overall = 0.1391                                        max =        22
       between = 0.1421                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1319                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Managertype                     Number of groups   =         5
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        65
. xtreg Feein OBXprQ RaisedRBill, re
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Appendix 7 
Test result, two-sample mean comparison fee 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho     .0192744   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02226262
     sigma_u    .00312099
                                                                              
       _cons     .0865199   .0152829     5.66   0.000      .056566    .1164739
        Time     .0025463   .0063212     0.40   0.687    -.0098431    .0149357
  Raisedreal    -3.82e-12   1.30e-12    -2.95   0.003    -6.36e-12   -1.28e-12
      OBXprQ    -.0000943   .0000417    -2.26   0.024    -.0001761   -.0000125
                                                                              
       Feein        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =         .
                                                Wald chi2(2)       =         .
       overall = 0.1817                                        max =        22
       between = 0.1097                                        avg =      13.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1831                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Managertype                     Number of groups   =         5
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        65
. xtreg Feein OBXprQ Raisedreal Time, re
OtherForeign           5    .0704775    .0408264   .0242041   .1307677
                                                                      
     Foreign          12    .0563558    .0315054   .0161653   .1428572
        Bank          20    .0428044    .0184169   .0104917   .0916619
      Issuer           6    .0413629    .0333537   .0005519   .0833771
   Financial          22    .0398128    .0156015   .0095777   .0627342
      Period          24     2008.75    1.748291     2006.1     2011.4
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.0043         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0086          Pr(T > t) = 0.9957
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       25
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(OtherForeign)                   t =  -2.8515
                                                                              
    diff             -.0306647    .0107539               -.0528127   -.0085167
                                                                              
combined        27    .0454914    .0047155    .0245025    .0357986    .0551843
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    .0704775    .0182581    .0408264    .0197848    .1211702
Financ~l        22    .0398128    .0033262    .0156015    .0328955    .0467301
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == OtherForeign, unpaired
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.4347         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8694          Pr(T > t) = 0.5653
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       26
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Issuer)                         t =  -0.1661
                                                                              
    diff             -.0015501    .0093318               -.0207319    .0176318
                                                                              
combined        28    .0401449    .0037595    .0198934    .0324311    .0478588
                                                                              
  Issuer         6    .0413629    .0136166    .0333537    .0063603    .0763655
Financ~l        22    .0398128    .0033262    .0156015    .0328955    .0467301
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Issuer, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0238         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0476          Pr(T > t) = 0.9762
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       32
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Foreign)                        t =  -2.0596
                                                                              
    diff              -.016543    .0080321               -.0329039   -.0001821
                                                                              
combined        34    .0456515    .0040226    .0234553    .0374675    .0538354
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    .0563558    .0090948    .0315054    .0363382    .0763734
Financ~l        22    .0398128    .0033262    .0156015    .0328955    .0467301
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Foreign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2860         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5721          Pr(T > t) = 0.7140
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       40
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Bank)                           t =  -0.5697
                                                                              
    diff             -.0029916    .0052514                -.013605    .0076218
                                                                              
combined        42    .0412374     .002601    .0168564    .0359845    .0464902
                                                                              
    Bank        20    .0428044    .0041181    .0184169     .034185    .0514238
Financ~l        22    .0398128    .0033262    .0156015    .0328955    .0467301
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Bank, unpaired
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.0667         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1334          Pr(T > t) = 0.9333
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       30
    diff = mean(Bank) - mean(Foreign)                             t =  -1.5426
                                                                              
    diff             -.0135514    .0087846               -.0314919    .0043891
                                                                              
combined        32    .0478862    .0043464    .0245871    .0390216    .0567508
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    .0563558    .0090948    .0315054    .0363382    .0763734
    Bank        20    .0428044    .0041181    .0184169     .034185    .0514238
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Bank == Foreign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5545         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8910          Pr(T > t) = 0.4455
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       24
    diff = mean(Bank) - mean(Issuer)                              t =   0.1385
                                                                              
    diff              .0014415    .0104113               -.0200463    .0229293
                                                                              
combined        26    .0424717    .0042996    .0219239    .0336165     .051327
                                                                              
  Issuer         6    .0413629    .0136166    .0333537    .0063603    .0763655
    Bank        20    .0428044    .0041181    .0184169     .034185    .0514238
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Bank == Issuer, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0148         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0297          Pr(T > t) = 0.9852
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       23
    diff = mean(Bank) - mean(OtherForeign)                        t =  -2.3181
                                                                              
    diff             -.0276731    .0119381               -.0523689   -.0029773
                                                                              
combined        25     .048339    .0051921    .0259606     .037623     .059055
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    .0704775    .0182581    .0408264    .0197848    .1211702
    Bank        20    .0428044    .0041181    .0184169     .034185    .0514238
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Bank == OtherForeign, unpaired
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.1820         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3640          Pr(T > t) = 0.8180
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       16
    diff = mean(Issuer) - mean(Foreign)                           t =  -0.9343
                                                                              
    diff             -.0149929    .0160472               -.0490115    .0190257
                                                                              
combined        18    .0513581    .0075364    .0319743    .0354577    .0672586
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    .0563558    .0090948    .0315054    .0363382    .0763734
  Issuer         6    .0413629    .0136166    .0333537    .0063603    .0763655
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Issuer == Foreign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1122         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2245          Pr(T > t) = 0.8878
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =        9
    diff = mean(Issuer) - mean(OtherForeign)                      t =  -1.3043
                                                                              
    diff             -.0291146    .0223213               -.0796089    .0213797
                                                                              
combined        11    .0545968    .0114976    .0381331    .0289786     .080215
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    .0704775    .0182581    .0408264    .0197848    .1211702
  Issuer         6    .0413629    .0136166    .0333537    .0063603    .0763655
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Issuer == OtherForeign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2252         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4505          Pr(T > t) = 0.7748
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       15
    diff = mean(Foreign) - mean(OtherForeign)                     t =  -0.7748
                                                                              
    diff             -.0141217    .0182257               -.0529688    .0247253
                                                                              
combined        17    .0605092    .0082001    .0338097    .0431259    .0778926
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    .0704775    .0182581    .0408264    .0197848    .1211702
 Foreign        12    .0563558    .0090948    .0315054    .0363382    .0763734
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Foreign == OtherForeign, unpaired
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Appendix 8 
Test result, two-sample mean comparison equity raised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OtherForeign           5    5.55e+08    6.62e+08   1.04e+07   1.41e+09
                                                                      
     Foreign          12    9.62e+08    2.75e+09   3.00e+07   9.66e+09
        Bank          20    8.28e+08    7.30e+08   2.45e+07   2.36e+09
      Issuer           6    1.17e+08    2.11e+08   1.10e+07   5.44e+08
   Financial          22    2.91e+09    2.90e+09   1.43e+08   1.20e+10
      Period          24     2008.75    1.748291     2006.1     2011.4
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9559         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0882          Pr(T > t) = 0.0441
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       25
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(OtherForeign)                   t =   1.7741
                                                                              
    diff              2.35e+09    1.33e+09               -3.78e+08    5.08e+09
                                                                              
combined        27    2.47e+09    5.36e+08    2.78e+09    1.37e+09    3.57e+09
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    5.55e+08    2.96e+08    6.62e+08   -2.67e+08    1.38e+09
Financ~l        22    2.91e+09    6.19e+08    2.90e+09    1.62e+09    4.19e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == OtherForeign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9857         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0286          Pr(T > t) = 0.0143
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       26
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Issuer)                         t =   2.3183
                                                                              
    diff              2.79e+09    1.20e+09                3.16e+08    5.26e+09
                                                                              
combined        28    2.31e+09    5.32e+08    2.82e+09    1.22e+09    3.40e+09
                                                                              
  Issuer         6    1.17e+08    8.61e+07    2.11e+08   -1.04e+08    3.38e+08
Financ~l        22    2.91e+09    6.19e+08    2.90e+09    1.62e+09    4.19e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Issuer, unpaired
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.9983         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0035          Pr(T > t) = 0.0017
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       40
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Bank)                           t =   3.1089
                                                                              
    diff              2.08e+09    6.69e+08                7.27e+08    3.43e+09
                                                                              
combined        42    1.92e+09    3.68e+08    2.38e+09    1.17e+09    2.66e+09
                                                                              
    Bank        20    8.28e+08    1.63e+08    7.30e+08    4.86e+08    1.17e+09
Financ~l        22    2.91e+09    6.19e+08    2.90e+09    1.62e+09    4.19e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Bank, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9668         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0665          Pr(T > t) = 0.0332
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       32
    diff = mean(Financial) - mean(Foreign)                        t =   1.9001
                                                                              
    diff              1.94e+09    1.02e+09               -1.40e+08    4.03e+09
                                                                              
combined        34    2.22e+09    5.08e+08    2.96e+09    1.19e+09    3.25e+09
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    9.62e+08    7.93e+08    2.75e+09   -7.84e+08    2.71e+09
Financ~l        22    2.91e+09    6.19e+08    2.90e+09    1.62e+09    4.19e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Financial == Foreign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9856         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0289          Pr(T > t) = 0.0144
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       24
    diff = mean(Bank) - mean(Issuer)                              t =   2.3244
                                                                              
    diff              7.11e+08    3.06e+08                7.96e+07    1.34e+09
                                                                              
combined        26    6.64e+08    1.40e+08    7.12e+08    3.76e+08    9.51e+08
                                                                              
  Issuer         6    1.17e+08    8.61e+07    2.11e+08   -1.04e+08    3.38e+08
    Bank        20    8.28e+08    1.63e+08    7.30e+08    4.86e+08    1.17e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Bank == Issuer, unpaired
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.4181         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8363          Pr(T > t) = 0.5819
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       30
    diff = mean(Bank) - mean(Foreign)                             t =  -0.2085
                                                                              
    diff             -1.34e+08    6.43e+08               -1.45e+09    1.18e+09
                                                                              
combined        32    8.78e+08    3.07e+08    1.73e+09    2.52e+08    1.50e+09
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    9.62e+08    7.93e+08    2.75e+09   -7.84e+08    2.71e+09
    Bank        20    8.28e+08    1.63e+08    7.30e+08    4.86e+08    1.17e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Bank == Foreign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7724         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4552          Pr(T > t) = 0.2276
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       23
    diff = mean(Bank) - mean(OtherForeign)                        t =   0.7596
                                                                              
    diff              2.73e+08    3.59e+08               -4.70e+08    1.02e+09
                                                                              
combined        25    7.73e+08    1.42e+08    7.12e+08    4.79e+08    1.07e+09
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    5.55e+08    2.96e+08    6.62e+08   -2.67e+08    1.38e+09
    Bank        20    8.28e+08    1.63e+08    7.30e+08    4.86e+08    1.17e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Bank == OtherForeign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2348         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4696          Pr(T > t) = 0.7652
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       16
    diff = mean(Issuer) - mean(Foreign)                           t =  -0.7407
                                                                              
    diff             -8.45e+08    1.14e+09               -3.26e+09    1.57e+09
                                                                              
combined        18    6.80e+08    5.30e+08    2.25e+09   -4.39e+08    1.80e+09
                                                                              
 Foreign        12    9.62e+08    7.93e+08    2.75e+09   -7.84e+08    2.71e+09
  Issuer         6    1.17e+08    8.61e+07    2.11e+08   -1.04e+08    3.38e+08
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Issuer == Foreign, unpaired
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.0786         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1571          Pr(T > t) = 0.9214
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =        9
    diff = mean(Issuer) - mean(OtherForeign)                      t =  -1.5434
                                                                              
    diff             -4.38e+08    2.83e+08               -1.08e+09    2.04e+08
                                                                              
combined        11    3.16e+08    1.51e+08    4.99e+08   -1.97e+07    6.51e+08
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    5.55e+08    2.96e+08    6.62e+08   -2.67e+08    1.38e+09
  Issuer         6    1.17e+08    8.61e+07    2.11e+08   -1.04e+08    3.38e+08
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Issuer == OtherForeign, unpaired
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6240         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7521          Pr(T > t) = 0.3760
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       15
    diff = mean(Foreign) - mean(OtherForeign)                     t =   0.3217
                                                                              
    diff              4.07e+08    1.27e+09               -2.29e+09    3.10e+09
                                                                              
combined        17    8.42e+08    5.60e+08    2.31e+09   -3.45e+08    2.03e+09
                                                                              
OtherF~n         5    5.55e+08    2.96e+08    6.62e+08   -2.67e+08    1.38e+09
 Foreign        12    9.62e+08    7.93e+08    2.75e+09   -7.84e+08    2.71e+09
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Foreign == OtherForeign, unpaired
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Introduction 
In our thesis we will explore the question: “How high are the cost charged by an 
underwriter, for raising equity for a Norwegian company noted on Oslo Stock 
Exchange and how does this compare to other markets?” 
 
In this preliminary thesis report we will present the research question and 
motivate it. We will present our hypotheses related to the research question, we 
will review the existing literature considering this topic and discuss the next steps 
in our thesis. 
 
The report is structured as follow; first we motivate our research question and 
discuss why this is a relevant topic, we will present findings from other countries 
for comparison and then give a short literature review before presenting our 
hypothesis. Furthermore we present some data found on one of the hypothesis so 
far, and end off with a discussion of how we will continue forward. 
 
 
Background 
Over the last ten years there has been a substantial development in how to book 
stock and bond trades over internet. Trading has been made easier, faster and 
cheaper due to more efficient systems and easier access. Since many investors 
now book the trades themselves online, the need for expensive brokers has 
decreased dramatically. Also brokers cannot compete with the speed of the 
automated computers who continuously look for mispriced stock and books a 
trade within a few milliseconds. When the brokerage firms lose their exclusivity 
in trading stocks they must lower their costs to face the competition. The 
brokerage firm’s incomes have decreased considerably due to this fact and have 
suffered from a decrease in trading as well. Hence, we believe that the brokerage 
companies must to a larger degree rely on income from corporate finance projects, 
such as rights issuance, open offers and placing to supply firms with new capital.  
 
Studies from the US have shown that the total cost for a firm of calling money 
from its stockholders amounts to 3-4% in Europe (da Silva et al. 2006) and 6-7% 
in the US (Jurin 1993), of the total amount called. High fees for such corporate 
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actions means that money is withdrawn from the firms, money that could have 
been spent to improve the value added for the stockholders. It is important in a 
sustainable and efficient market that the price of raising capital is not to high, as 
this will reduce the possibilities for swift funding of new projects and 
investments.  
 
After the finance crisis and the upcoming Basel III framework, which increases 
the requirement for banks equity ratio, the supply of bank loans has decreased. 
(Deloitte 2012) This makes other ways of funding, such as placements and issues 
more current. This is an issue, which has not received much attention, but can 
have an impact on investors return over time.  
 
 
Research question and literature review 
The focus and research question of our thesis will be: “How high are the cost 
charged by an underwriter, for raising equity for a Norwegian company noted on 
Oslo Stock Exchange and how does this compare to other markets?” 
We will make an estimation of the costs of raising capital and compare this to 
studies in relevant countries, such as the US, the UK and Germany. We do not 
know of any previous studies exploring this subject in Norway. There has not 
been many studies pin pointing the exact costs of raising capital in different 
markets so the available data for comparison is poor but present, for the larger 
markets. 
 
There are several costs-aspects of raising capital, examples are: fixed costs, 
variable costs such as performance fee, warrants to the underwriter, 
discount/under pricing, the bid-ask spread, transactions fees, tax. (Clifford W. 
Smith jr., 1978) We will focus on the explicit fees charged by the underwriter for 
an issue or an initial public offering (IPO), as the scope of the thesis does not 
permit us to include all costs. Costs of raising equity through issues and IPOs will 
let us estimate the costs of raising capital for firms noted or to be noted on the 
stock exchange, thus larger firms which are of interest to the majority of investors.  
 
Not only are there many ways to measure costs of raising capital, there are also 
many ways of raising it. The most common methods are: initial public offering, 
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private and public placements, rights issues and SEOs, convertible bonds. (Inmoo 
Lee et al., 1996) Other ways are: dividend reinvestment plans, share purchase 
plans and accelerated issues. (ASX, 2010) 
Again, due to the scope of the thesis, we will focus on issues and IPOs made on 
Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2001-2011. 
 
We would like to group the issues and IPOs into industrial sectors, to see if there 
are higher costs in industries with high risk and/or with low liquidity. Clifford W. 
Smith jr. (1978) describes the work of underwriters as an insurance to eliminate 
the uncertainty of an offerings’ success. Therefore we would expect to find that 
the more risky and less liquid the stocks and industry, the higher the underwriter 
fee will be, with analogy to insurances. Similarly, in the 2012 study by Deloitte 
finds that financial risk decreases with turnover, as firms with higher turnover 
have easier access to external funding. We therefore expect larger firms with high 
turnover, raising larger amounts in each issue will have lower costs of raising 
capital. 
 
We hypothesize that the lower the amount rose in an issue, the costs are 
proportionately higher than larger issues due to high fixed costs for the 
underwriters. We would therefore group the issues into ranges according to size to 
test this hypothesis. In the study of Inmoo Lee et al. (1996), they found clear 
evidence of economies of scale for all types of securities, which is in line with our 
hypothesis. 
 
As presented earlier, we hypothesize that reduced profitability from brokerage of 
stocks due to increased competition from low cost-competitors such as internet-
brokers, has led to increased fees charged in the corporate finance sector as a 
counterweight. We therefore expect to see lower income from stock brokerage, 
i.e. lower fees for the investors and increased costs for the companies raising 
capital from the market. This hypothesis is very much in line with Norges Bank’s 
hypothesis that the new trading-system put in place on Oslo Stock Exchange in 
1999, would increase the available market and therefore competition thereby 
reducing commissions and the possibility to dominate the trade in single stocks. 
(Sindre Weme, 1999) 
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Dependent on our results we would like to discuss reasons for why raising capital 
is more/less expensive in Norway than other countries. This may be explained by 
more/less competition between underwriters or it might simply be a result of 
differing demand in the market. However, a possible way of measuring this may 
be to compare number of issues and underwriters from country to country. 
 
Finally we would like to discuss if the costs of raising capital can be defended 
with respect to stockholders demand for return. The alternative cost of not being 
able to make a new investment due to insufficient funding, the access to fresh 
capital for struggling firms may be considerably larger. 
 
 
Methodology 
As we want to explore how high the actual costs charged by the corresponding 
underwriters are, we will make use of simple statistics to shed light upon our 
research questions. As the data we have collected is from various sources, one 
important job is to get the data aligned so that the comparisons and the results in 
general yield meaningful information. 
 
As described earlier some of the research done earlier regarding this topic states 
the costs as a percentage of the total amount of capital issued. Hence, we will 
reformulate the costs Norwegian firms listed at Oslo Stock Exchange have at 
raising capital as: 
               
                       
    . 
 
In other parts of our thesis we want to examine whether there are similarities 
across industrial sectors. This can be explored by a statistical model, in 
accordance to Marie Davidan (2006). This can be of the pattern: 
Yij = costs for firm i at time t 
If we compare between industries we can further on include that 
Gi = industry indicator = 0 if oil-related, 1 if non-oil related. 
 
Hence, for firm i at time t: 
Yij = β0(oil) + β1(oil)tij + εij if i is oil 
Yij = β0(non-oil) + β1(non-oil)tij + εij if i is non-oil 
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 Yij = β0(oil)(1 - Gi) + β0(non-oil)Gi + β1(oil)(1 - Gi) + β1(non-oil)Gi + εij 
This can be fitted into the OLS, and tested for β1(oil) = β1(non-oil). 
 
Further on we want to check for evidence of economies of scale in our sample, as 
Inmoo Lee et al. (1996) found evidence of in their study. One possible solution is 
to check for u-shaped spreads, similar to what is done in Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2000). Here we consider the spread as the total cash compensation paid to the 
underwriter (fee), relative to the gross proceeds (P): 
Spread(P) = 
   
 
 
this can be written as the sum of fixed and variable costs 
Spread (P) = 
 
 
 + unspread (P) | K = fixed costs, unspread (P) = var.costs pr. dollar 
proceeds.  
 
Further on the marginal spread, mspread (P) is obtained by multiplying the 
spreads by the proceeds. Obtaining the total fee, and differentiating the total fee 
wrt. to the proceeds 
 
mspread (P) = 
    
         
  
               
   
 = 
                 
   
. 
Thus we can write: 
           
   
 = 
                     
 
. 
 
The latter equation depicts a potential trade-off between the decline in the 
syndicate’s average fixed cost and an increase in its average variable cost. Hence, 
there is no a priori reason to rule out that some issuers will experience scale 
economies, while others experience diseconomies. However, as Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2000) points out, under the popular view the economies of scale 
predominate and the spread is falling. And from above we see that if spreads are 
falling this imply that the marginal spread must be smaller than the average 
spread.  
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Scale economies                B) U-shaped spreads 
 
 
Interpretation 
The graphs above describe the differences between pure economies of scale and 
the view of u-shaped spread curves. 
From figure A the regression ES is fitted to the sample and suggests a clear trade 
off between spread and proceeds. If a firm choose allocation a in the figure they 
can clearly expand their offer to v and pay a lower spread. 
Figure B shows that issues that require lot of service (low type) and issues of high 
quality (high type) follow a pattern. It can easily be seen that firms face a u-
shaped spread and thus rising marginal cost of capital within a quality group. A 
firm at allocation (a) cannot trade a higher bid against lower spread, but will in 
fact face higher spreads if increasing bid. 
 
The correlation between income from brokerage and issues and counseling is 
0,74. This indicates that the incomes move together and are mainly influenced by 
economic conditions. We may therefore run a regression analysis as this will help 
us explain why costs have changed over time, i.e. if it changes with activity or 
value on the stock exchange etc.  
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Data 
We will in our thesis use Norwegian data only. We will use data from 2001 to 
2011 if available, as this will give us a rich statistical foundation and we can 
investigate development in costs. It may be necessary to look at such a long time 
period as the financial crisis which started 2008 may give skewed results. 
 
The income from brokerage and issues are given to us by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway (Finanstilsynet), these are quarterly data from 
January 2001 to October 2012. Data from issues made on Oslo Stock Exchange 
are readily available on Oslo Stock Exchanges homepages, from 1997 and is 
continually updated with new events. Key figures about activity on Oslo Stock 
Exchange are also available on their homepages, but only back to January 2006. 
 
For data about the fees charged for each issue, we plan on using the prospects 
issued by the underwriters before the issue. Some underwriters, such as DnB 
Markets, have these prospects available on their homepages. We do not expect to 
find detailed information in the prospects, such as the division between fixed costs 
and variable fees, for instance performance fees for the underwriter. If such 
detailed information is needed for our survey, we might have to contact the 
underwriters directly. 
 
So far we have looked at how income from equity brokering and issues have 
developed, to see if there is any support for our hypothesis that reduced income 
from brokerage, due to lower costs and volume has led to increased costs and 
therefore income from issues. The figure below shows the yearly income from 
both activities from 1st quarter 2001 to 4th quarter 2011. We see that the incomes 
are at the same level in 2001, but that income from issues/consulting are rising to 
a higher level in the midst of the period, and in 2006-2007 are in fact 
approximately 2.5 times larger than income from brokerage. In 2008 when the 
financial crisis hit, the income in both sectors fell sharply, and in 2011 income 
from brokerage was below the income from 2001 while the income from 
issues/consulting was approximately one milliard NOK higher than in 2001. 
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Figure 1: Income from brokerage vs. issues and counseling, yearly aggregate. 
 
The linear line of the period indicates that the income from issues/consulting has 
increased twice as much as income from brokerage. This effect however stems 
much from the years 2006 and 2007, which were very good years for the 
underwriters. 
 
The income from brokerage did increase in the period, but suffered a blow from 
the financial crisis. We have therefore compared the income from brokerage with 
the activity level on Oslo Stock Exchange to see if the reduces income come from 
reduced activity. As we currently only have the key figures from Oslo Stock 
Exchange from 2004, we have looked at the period 1st quarter 2004 to 4th quarter 
2011. The income from brokerage has been reduced to a quarter over the period, 
from approximately 800 million NOK to 200 million NOK. The amount of trades 
how ever has doubled, from 3 million trades in 1st quarter 2006 to 6 million trades 
in 4th quarter 2011. This proves that the income per trade has been significantly 
reduced over the period. 
 
Figure 2: Income from brokerage vs. number of trades in the period. 
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Similar results appear if we compare the market value of the trades made on Oslo 
Stock Exchange with the income from brokerage. The two follow each other 
closely until the finance crisis in 2008, where they both fall. However, as the 
income from brokerage continue to fall in the remainder of the period, the market 
value of the trades increase, again indicating lower income per trade for the 
brokerage companies. 
 
Figure 3: Income from brokerage vs. market value of traded equity. 
 
Income per equity traded is approximately halved from 1st quarter 2004 to 4th 
quarter 2011. Which is quite interesting as in 2004 we see the income from issues 
and counseling rising much higher than income from brokerage in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 4: Income per traded equity. 
 
It is more difficult to make a valid conclusion regarding the income from issues 
and counseling. There is no clear pattern of changes in the cost levels of issues. 
There does however seem to be a consistency that in periods with little amount 
being raised, the income of the underwriters are proportionally higher than in 
period with large amounts being raised. This may indicate high fixed costs for the 
underwriters, but also the fact that we only have data for issues and counseling. 
Fixed fees for standing counseling services may explain why incomes does not 
move more in sync with amount raised. We need to look at the prospects for each 
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issue to be able to make a clearer picture of the development, and to be able to 
discuss the research question and hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 5: Equity raised vs. income from issues and counseling. 
 
 
Next steps 
The next step of our project will be gathering information from prospects of each 
particular issuance made in our chosen time period. First when this data is 
gathered we can start grouping the material into sub categories, such as industries, 
size etc. As we see it now, our major challenge might be to gather information on 
issues made a wile back, as these are not easily electronically available. However 
the larger and more recent ones should be accessible at the respective 
underwriters. 
 
When this is done we should be able to analyze the material and hopefully discuss 
our findings. This said, we do not expect any problems analyzing our data, as this 
not require any intricate methodological processes. 
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